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Abstract 
The 70-year-old conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the fields in International 
Relations that has come under extensive research. Yet, a great deal of attention has been 
allocated to official negotiations while the importance of non-official actors lacks 
analysis. However, the contribution that these actors can make to the peace-building 
process is crucial for understanding the underlying mechanisms for the transformation 
and subsequent resolution of the conflict. In this light, the thesis aims to fill in the 
aforementioned gap by looking into the role that 30 civil society organizations (CSOs) 
engaged in the peace-building process have played at the level of ordinary citizens, as 
well as that of the official policy lines concerning conflict resolution, analyzing the 
matter through the lenses of Track Two Diplomacy.  As a result, the research has found 
that although the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict have mobilized public 
support for peace-building, brought people from the conflicting parties closer and have 
contributed to their reconciliation, they have had only limited effect on official policy 
lines dealing with conflict resolution. 
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Introduction 
 
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most controversial, violent and polarizing 
intractable conflicts of the world. Its various aspects have been the topics for numerous 
pieces of scholarly work. However, when discussing the opportunities for building 
peace, transforming or resolving the conflict at hand, the role of governmental-level 
decision makers from either sides or third-party mediation is usually investigated. Much 
of the International Relations scholarship has not allocated sufficient attention to the 
significance of hostile attitudes and deeply-rooted stereotypes that the Israeli and the 
Palestinian societies have towards each other. Nor has substantive research been 
produced about the ways in which the eradication of such negative perceptions could 
help build peace and serve as a basis for the transformation of the conflict and its 
subsequent resolution, as well as the involvement of non-official actors in these 
processes. In this light, a growing body of literature that looks specifically into these 
issues and diverts its focus from the governmental level, revolves around Track Two 
Diplomacy, which refers to the engagement of ordinary citizens, civil society leaders, 
journalists, opinion leaders and other non-officials in the process of conflict resolution 
in order to better comprehend the underlying dynamics of the conflict and transform it 
into a peaceful coexistence.  
By the same logic, the thesis aims to fill in the aforementioned gap by looking into the 
role that non-official actors in the conflict, namely civil society organizations (CSOs) 
have had since 2006 in the peace-building process of the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
analyzing the matter through the lenses of Track Two Diplomacy. More precisely, it 
investigates the impact that 30 Israeli, Palestinian and International CSOs have had at 
grassroots level (i.e. the level of ordinary citizens), as well as at the level of official 
policy lines concerning conflict resolution. The reasons for selecting the period from 
2006 onwards are several. Firstly, 2006 was the year of another opening of 
comprehensive peace talks between the parties, with negotiations revolving around the 
two-state solution. What is noteworthy here, though, is that it was civil society 
initiatives created in 2003 and 2004 that preceded these talks, demonstrating that it was 
possible to develop a mutually acceptable formula for the two-state solution. Secondly, 
these initiatives gathered tens of thousands of signatures from both Israelis and 
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Palestinians, which had the purpose of mobilizing sufficient public support to pressure 
the two parties as well as creating legitimacy for negotiating an agreement. Therefore, 
peace-building was given a new momentum and optimistic sentiment in the Israeli, as 
well as the Palestinian society began to materialize. Finally, the above-mentioned 
initiatives were the two most successful Track Two efforts since the collapse of the 
Oslo Peace Accords. Thus, they can be considered a turning point in the field, opening 
new opportunities for conflict transformation, especially after the Israeli disengagement 
from Gaza in 2005, which gave Palestinians additional hope that an independent 
Palestine could soon be created.  
The thesis relies on Track Two Diplomacy as its theoretical foundation. For the 
empirical part, it employs a five-indicator framework that evaluates the influence of 
Track Two Diplomacy efforts, in this case those of the selected CSOs, beginning from 
the very foundation of their activities (Inputs) and ending with the maximum effect they 
can have (Impacts). What is more, the research question posed by this work is the 
following: what is the role of CSOs in peace-building in the case of Israel-Palestine 
conflict? The thesis assumes that the ultimate goal of Track Two activities is to 
influence official policy-making lines. Therefore, its main argument is that although 
CSOs can mobilize public support for peace-building, bring people from the conflicting 
parties closer and contribute to their reconciliation, they have only limited effect on 
official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution.  
The theoretical part of the thesis is based on the key literature about the topic of Track 
Two Diplomacy, which serves as a useful tool for understanding the general role that 
Track Two activities can play in peace-building. As for the empirical part, in order to 
follow the framework, the websites of the selected CSOs were the most significant 
source, but various articles, leaflets and studies that review the impact of these 
organizations were also of good use. Most importantly, for measuring certain indicators 
of the framework, where possible, online interviews with the representatives of these 
CSOs were conducted. In other cases, the thesis relied on online surveys with these 
organizations. However, the main problem that arose during the process of measuring 
the role that these CSOs have played was the fact that four out of the 30 CSOs did not 
respond or did not agree to participate in the research in any form. In these cases, 
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secondary sources, namely their own reports about their impacts were looked at, which 
proved to be a sufficient basis for the evaluation.  
As for the structure of the thesis, it begins with a brief and a general discussion about 
intractable conflicts and their characteristics. It then moves to Track Two Diplomacy 
itself, outlining its different interpretations, concrete mechanisms, its evolution and its 
different types. Most importantly, however, this section describes the various roles 
Track Two activities can have, as well as quite a few limitations that they face, which 
also helps to form adequate expectations about the influence that the selected CSOs can 
have. Finally, the theoretical part of the thesis ends with a chapter about the context of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict, highlighting the most pressing issues that make this exact 
conflict intractable. Moreover, the methodological section of the thesis begins with a 
chapter presenting a few words about the Israeli and the Palestinian civil society in 
general, while also discussing the basis for selecting the concrete CSOs. It should also 
be noted that these organizations are divided into five following categories: Grassroots 
Organizations, Resistance Movements, Informants, Politically Involved Organizations 
and Mixed Organizations. This is followed by a chapter about the research design and 
methods, which also describes in detail the framework employed for evaluating the 
impact of the CSOs and elaborates on the ways its each indicator works. Last but not 
least, the empirical part is the section of the thesis that presents the actual measurement 
of the role that the selected CSOs have played according to their categories and the five 
indicators, which is followed by a summary of the findings and concluding remarks.  
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1. Track Two Diplomacy 
 
1.1. The Definition of Track Two Diplomacy 
 
As the broad focus of the thesis is the effect Track Two Diplomacy can play in peace-
building in intractable conflicts, a few words should be said about these as well.  In very 
general terms, intractable conflicts are those that persist because they are seemingly 
irresolvable. Other characteristics associated with intractable conflicts include being 
violent, zero-sum, central to the lives of the parties involved and, in general, revolving 
around the needs and the values that are necessary for their survival (Gawerc, 2006: 
436). To conceptualize the phenomenon, labels such as “deeply-rooted conflict,” 
“protracted social conflict,” and “enduring rivalry” have also been used (Coleman et al., 
2007: 3). However, the three dimensions that distinguish intractable conflicts, according 
to Kriesberg (2005) are the following: (1) they persist for a long time; (2) they are 
waged in ways that are perceived as destructive and (3) attempts to transform them 
usually fail (Kriesberg, 2005: 66). Nevertheless, following Kriesberg, these kinds of 
conflicts are not entirely intractable but only up to a certain degree, meaning that there 
is still a possibility of at least transforming them into peaceful relations.  
A frequently-used approach for the transformation of such conflicts is Track Two 
Diplomacy, which is also called Track Two Approach or “Citizens’” Diplomacy. It can 
be broadly defined as the process which brings together professionals, journalists, 
opinion leaders, scholars, civil society leaders or other currently or potentially 
influential non-officials from conflicting parties to better comprehend the underlying 
dynamics of a conflict in order to explore different possibilities for resolving it or 
transforming violence (or potential violence) into a collaborative peace-building 
(Davies & Kaufman, 2003: 2). Nevertheless, Track Two Diplomacy, .like a lot of other 
widely-used concepts in the field of International Relations, does not have a single, 
fixed definition and different interpretations of its meaning exist. There have been 
attempts to define Track Two in terms of the specifics of the activity itself, concluding 
what is typical for this approach based on the many cases it has been applied to. 
Moreover, Track Two Diplomacy has also been conceptualized in terms of the actors or 
types of actors involved in these kinds of processes, determining the role different 
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individuals or groups and their characteristics might play. Finally, many have looked at 
Track Two Approach through the lenses of its place in the larger negotiating process, 
seeing it as mainly a form of prenegotiation – informal talks which help the parties to 
get to an official negotiation table (Jones, 2015: 8). In any case, Track Two is regarded 
as a complementary tool to Track One Diplomacy, which includes official, 
governmental-level negotiations and activities.   
Hussein Agha, Ahmad Khalidi, Shai Feldman, and Zeev Schiff are two Palestinian and 
two Israeli prominent authors in the field of Track Two Diplomacy, who distinguish 
between “soft” and “hard” Track Two. They term dialogues aimed at exchanging ideas, 
views, and perceptions, which leads to fostering mutual understanding of each other’s 
positions and policies between the adversaries, as “soft.” Track Two exercises that are 
primarily concerned with transferring policies to Track One and helping negotiate 
political agreements, are labeled as “hard” (Agha et al., 2003: 3). 
The same authors define Track Two Diplomacy by what it is not. Not all types of 
interaction between non-officials from the conflicting parties constitute Track Two. 
Rather, Track Two talks are convened with the direct purpose of fostering informal 
interaction and the exchange of insights about the underlying causes of the conflict 
(Ibid: 2).  For example, academic conferences in which both Israeli and Arab scholars 
participate do not present a type of Track Two activity just because they are meetings of 
non-officials. In the same manner, secret diplomacy conducted between governmental 
representatives does not represent an instance of Track Two only because it has a non-
official character due to its secrecy.  
Regardless of the way in which Track Two might be defined, all of the interpretations 
share several common features. First of all, they all emphasize the importance of 
informal dialogues, often referred to as “problem-solving workshops,” which bring the 
conflicting parties together and which, in many cases, include a third party. 1 Secondly, 
even though these dialogues are informal, it is generally expected that either the 
participants will have access to official decision-makers or that the outcomes of these 
                                                          
1 Not all Track Two activities include third parties. Some of them are facilitated directly by citizens from 
the two sides. The activities in the Israel-Palestine conflict include both types of Track Two activities, the 
most prominent third parties being Swiss and Norwegian NGOs, the US, the EU and the UN.   
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workshops will affect them, influencing the conflict dynamics in this way. Thirdly, 
these workshops are not necessarily held in secret, but they generally have a covert 
character, enabling the participants to ditch the official positions of the party they 
represent and actually address the underlying causes of the conflict and generate 
alternative approaches (Jones, 2015: 25).   
1.2. The Evolution of Track Two Diplomacy 
 
Surprisingly enough, the term “Track Two Diplomacy” was not coined until quite 
recently. It first appeared in print in a journal article by William D. Davidson and 
Joseph V. Montville published in 1981, where Track Two Diplomacy was 
conceptualized as unofficial, non-structured interaction that is always open-minded, 
optimistic, altruistic and that can help resolve or transform conflicts through human 
capabilities, good will and reasonableness (Davidson and Montville, 1981: 155). 
Montville later redefined Track Two as “unofficial, informal interaction between 
members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, 
influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that 
might help resolve the conflict (Montville, 1991: 162 via Jones, 2015: 9).” The term 
itself was coined in a very simple manner: Montville noted that if official governmental 
activities could be referred to as Track One, then the informal process could have been 
called Track Two (Jones, 2015: 10). 
Nevertheless, although it is difficult to name exactly when Track Two activities first 
emerged, processes similar to what we call Track Two today started at least before the 
World War I in forms of “peace societies” that often convened in The Hague. After the 
end of World War II, a private group called “Moral Rearmament” involving German, 
French and, later, British citizens often met to find ways for reconciliation between the 
nations. In parallel with these activities in Europe, an international NGO called the 
Institute of Pacific Relations was the main driving force for unofficial dialogues in the 
Asia-Pacific region between the years 1928-1961 (Ibid: 12-13).  
The first instance of modern Track Two occurred in 1960 when a US spy airplane was 
shot down in the Soviet airspace. This led to a serious diplomatic crisis but it was 
alleviated by meetings of unofficial American and Soviet delegations, including 
14 
 
academics and ex-officials, at Dartmouth College, initiated by the then US President 
Dwight Eisenhower’s friend Norman Cousins (Homans, 2011). However, even though 
Track Two activities were often carried out in the following period as well, they did not 
gain as much popularity as they currently enjoy straightaway. Official policy-makers 
considered these kinds of activities as irrelevant and, in worst cases, as a nuisance, since 
“freelance diplomacy” could damage the real one (Ibid). Moreover, in the Cold War 
period, IR was dominated by Realist and, particularly, Neorealist theoretical school, 
which regarded non-state actors as unimportant. At the same time, conflict resolution 
theorists formulated alternative ideas about the ways conflicts could be resolved, 
emphasizing the role of social justice, gender, culture, ethnicity and similar concepts. A 
key document facilitating the new thinking about international conflicts was the 
“Agenda for Peace” released by the then United Nations (UN) Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The report highlighted the changing context of the 
international system, in which the ideological rivalry of the East and West was over but 
the tension between North and South was increasing. Therefore, as Boutros-Ghali put it, 
such a new system called for new approaches like preventive diplomacy, peace-
building, peace-making and confidence-building (Ghali, 1992). In addition, the 1990s 
was also a remarkable period for Track Two activities, which facilitated a major and the 
most successful peace agreement between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) – the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords were the two peace agreements signed in 
1993 and 1995 in the Norwegian capital of Oslo. 2 Though the Oslo process is 
considered to have ultimately failed, it still achieved some breakthroughs, since both 
parties officially recognized each other for the first time and some of the provisions of 
the agreement were actually implemented, which was followed by the acceptance of the 
right of Palestinians to create a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the former 
Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon.  
As we can see, Track Two Diplomacy had to win credibility and it was strengthened as 
a conflict management tool in the 1990s. In the Middle East alone, approximately 100 
                                                          
2 The Oslo Accords are often referred to as an instance of Track 1,5 Diplomacy (discussed further)  
because besides local grassroots organizations and Norwegian scholars, governmental officials from 
both sides were also involved. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Oslo started as a Track Two initiative, it 
was later transformed into a full-fledged Track One diplomacy, including a handshake between the then 
Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and the then leader of PLO Yasser Arafat.  
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Track Two events were organized during this decade (roughly one activity per month on 
average). What is more, around 750 regional and extraregional elite members 
participated in these events, of which an estimated 200 were from the military (Kaye, 
2007: xiv). Consequently, Track Two has increased in popularity and has been applied 
to numerous other conflicts, including the most violent ones like in Bosnia and Georgia. 
1.3. The Role of Track Two Diplomacy 
 
As it has already been mentioned, Track Two Diplomacy is an alternative approach to 
conflict resolution, but it does not mean that it can stand alone or that it can lead to full 
resolution of conflicts. It serves as a complementary tool to Track One diplomacy and 
contributes to peace-building. It is noteworthy that peace-building does not mean the 
establishment of immediate and absolute peace. Rather, it implies measures targeted to 
reduce the risk of an occurrence or reoccurrence of a conflict by addressing root causes, 
institution-building and political and economic transformation in order to lay the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development (United Nations, 2010: 5). Therefore, 
Track Two efforts do not aim to have uninterrupted influence on Track One 
negotiations. On the contrary, their goals are conflict management, tension reduction 
and confidence-building (Kaye, 2007: 5).  
The role that Track Two Diplomacy can play during conflicts is multi-faceted and 
varies case by case. First of all, it can lead to changed perceptions about the conflict and 
the “other” and trust-building in the long run. The most common change in attitudes is 
the breakdown of negative stereotypes and prejudices. Close interactions between the 
participants of Track Two events help them realize that the “other” has suffered in the 
conflict as much. Such an understanding lays the initial foundation for building trust 
between the parties (Chigas, 2003: 7-9).  
Secondly, unofficial dialogues can open new channels for communication to parties that 
previously had fewer or no means thereof. Moreover, they can also improve the quality 
of communication when the participants of these dialogues realize how hate speech and 
hostile language lead to mutual mistrust and misperceptions. As a result, they start 
developing a de-escalatory and a cooperative language, which enhances communication 
between the parties and, thus, helps solve problems more effectively (Ibid: 8).   
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Thirdly, Track Two activities can prepare the ground for transmitting or actually 
transfer new ideas and policies to Track One, like it happened in the case of Oslo 
Accords of 1993-1995. The ideas generated through Track Two events can gradually 
change the political thinking of not only the general public but the governing elites as 
well. This, in turn, can affect the official policies of the adversaries (Kelman, 2008: 49). 
In the Israel-Palestine conflict, Track Two initiatives created in 2003 demonstrated to 
the negotiating partners that it was possible to develop a mutually acceptable formula 
for a two-state solution (Kelman, 2007: 299). These two initiatives were The 
Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement published in the fall of 2003 and the Geneva Initiative 
devised in 2003 and launched as the Geneva Accord in 2004. These two plans 
effectively challenged the dominant narratives of both sides that there was no partner on 
the other side willing to agree to a mutually acceptable solution (Kelman, 2005: 20). It 
is also equally important that these initiatives gathered tens of thousands of signatures 
from both Israelis and Palestinians, which had the purpose of mobilizing enough public 
support to pressure the two parties as well as creating legitimacy to negotiate an 
agreement (Ibid).   
Fourthly, the informal and unofficial nature of Track Two meetings enable the 
participants do discuss ideas more openly, including the ones that are too bold or 
sensitive for official negotiations. Therefore, unofficial processes generate many new 
options for carrying on with negotiations, which aims at gradual de-escalation of 
conflicts (Chigas, 2003: 10). After the Oslo Agreements, a new project called the 
Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations was initiated. The group met 
periodically between the years 1994 and 1999 and not only produced joint papers on 
what was required for long-standing peaceful relations between the nations, but it also 
provided further options for negotiations about the final status of the Israeli-Palestinian 
interaction, as well as post-negotiation peace-building (Kelman, 2008: 32).  
Finally, Track Two events can lead to a development of networks of influential people 
who can work on changing the views in their regions or countries or act as impartial 
third parties (Jones, 2015: 26). In addition, they can also create social networks that can 
serve as watchdogs for minimizing the possibility of outbreaks of violence or 
discrediting peace agreements (Chigas, 2003: 11). However, it is not always necessary 
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that Track Two Diplomacy meets all of the goals set for it to be considered successful 
or relatively successful.  
1.4. The Limits of Track Two Diplomacy 
 
Track Two Diplomacy has quite a few limitations as well. Even though unofficial 
dialogues generally aim to move away from the official positions of the adversaries, 
they still cannot be completely isolated from the political context in which they are held. 
The participants are still sensitive to the political developments in their own 
communities and as well as media coverage (Ibid: 12). In intractable conflicts like the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, these contexts are inherently hostile, exacerbating these 
problems even further. Hostile contexts also make it difficult to maintain the changed 
attitudes that the parties have towards each other. Even though unofficial dialogues 
attempt to redefine “us” and “them,” other social contexts reinforce the participants’ 
existing identities due to fear, prejudices and stereotypes (Ibid).  
Another challenge for Track Two approach is that in order to obtain tangible results, 
finding an appropriate group of practitioners that carry out these activities is required. 
Such a group needs to consist of people that are acceptable to both sides, as well as 
domestic constituencies, that have influence and that represent a large number of units 
from their regions or countries. Assembling such a group is extremely hard and even if 
it does happen, it is not always certain that the activities will produce positive outcomes. 
The parties’ attitudes towards each other might as well deteriorate instead of improving. 
In such a situation, the participants are less likely to support any new policies or further 
advancement towards peace-building (Kaye, 2007: 26). Following the same line, even 
when Track Two activities do generate favourable ideas and policies, “selling” them at 
home is another obstacle. Societies that have experienced long-standing conflicts with 
high levels of violence are, generally, less receptive to cooperative agendas (Ibid: 27). 
What is more, Track Two processes do not usually receive wide media coverage in 
intractable conflicts such as the one at hand, where both sides heavily control the media 
content about these matters. Such a situation presents another drawback for spreading 
collaborative sentiment domestically.  
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Furthermore, inequality between the parties is another limitation for Track Two 
Diplomacy. The differences in power and the resources are often reflected in the 
participants’ views. As a result, the weaker side sometimes loses momentum because it 
has the impression that the peace-building activities neglect the imbalances (Chigas, 
2003: 13). Moreover, such inequalities also affect the problems that the parties want to 
address. This is most visible in the Israel-Palestine conflict, in which the Palestinian 
side is more concerned about changing the political views that Israel has while Jews try 
to build channels of communication and social connection. In addition, Palestinian 
Track Two practitioners are, generally, more interested in upholding human rights of 
their fellow citizens in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip rather than constructing 
a unified society with Jews.  
Last but not least, adequate investment in Track Two Diplomacy is necessary for 
developing and maintaining a stable network of practitioners as well as carrying out 
these activities in general. In case of the absence of such funding, it becomes difficult to 
influence the conflict dynamics in any way. This trend was well reflected in the 
Palestinian case where quite a few NGOs working in Track Two fields simply stopped 
to exist.  
1.5. Track One and a Half Diplomacy 
 
Track One and a Half Diplomacy (Track 1.5 Diplomacy) has been used by many in the 
sphere of conflict resolution. Susan Allen Nan defined it as “unofficial interactions 
between official representatives of states (Nan, 2003: 6). She later redefined the concept 
as “diplomatic initiatives that are facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involve 
officials from the conflict in question (Nan, 2005: 165 via Mapendere, 2005: 69).  
Mapendere conceptualizes Track 1.5 Diplomacy in a similar way:  private or public 
interaction between official representatives of the conflicting governments or the 
political entities that is facilitated or mediated by a third party that is not a political unit. 
Such an interaction is targeted towards changing attitudes between parties, which serves 
the purpose of altering the political power structures that have caused the conflict 
(Mapendere, 2000: 16 via Mapendere, 2005: 69).  
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One the one hand, the main distinguishing feature of Track 1.5 Diplomacy from Track 
One Diplomacy is that even though the former involves official political 
representatives, it is not facilitated or mediated by an official third party. The Camp 
David I, which refers to the peace negotiations between the then PM of Israel 
Menachem Begin and the then president of Egypt Anwar El Sadat, is an example of a 
pure Track One Diplomacy because it was mediated by an official – the then US 
president Jimmy Carter. On the other hand, Track 1.5 Diplomacy is also different from 
Track Two Diplomacy because the latter does not include governmental representatives 
and is facilitated by non-officials. Therefore, the Oslo Process is often regarded as an 
instance of Track 1.5 Diplomacy because apart from grassroots organizations and 
Norwegian scholars, it also saw the involvement of official representatives from Israel 
and the PLO.  
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2. Israel-Palestine Conflict as an Intractable Conflict  
 
The 70-year old conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the longest and the most 
severe protracted conflicts of the world. It meets the three above-mentioned criteria of 
intractable conflicts (persistence, destructiveness, and the difficulty to transform) as 
well as being compatible with the alternative labels (deeply-rooted conflict, protracted 
social conflict, and enduring rivalry). It is generally accepted that the confrontation 
between Palestinian Arabs living in the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
river Jordan and Jews migrating to this place, broke out because of the possession of 
this exact territory. One of the reasons behind the migration of Jews was the concept of 
Zionism, which implies the idea that this territory is the homeland of Jews, which was 
given to them by their God – Yahweh – and they started living here in the 1st 
Millennium BC, in the biblical kingdoms of David and Solomon (Harms, 2008: 51).  
What is more, the Balfour Declaration issued by the British Empire in 1917 expressed 
support for the Zionist cause. Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, who had already 
lived in this territory since the seventh century, also considered that they had a legal 
right to create an independent state based on McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 
1915-16 (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 54).  
Besides the question of territory, there are numerous matters that make this conflict 
intractable, which have led to multiple failed attempts to find a political settlement. To 
begin with, one of the most acute and sensitive issues is the extremely large scale of 
violence that has accompanied the conflict since its inception. After the creation of 
Medinath Yisrael – the State of Israel on May 14th, 1948, the territory between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the river Jordan has seen six wars between Israel and the Arab 
states; two Palestinian intifadas – the uprising of the Palestinian people against Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip; four major 
armed confrontations between Israel and Hamas – a group deemed as a terrorist 
organization by Israel; as well as daily clashes between Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and 
Palestinian civilians/combatants; hundreds of suicide bombing and other types of 
terrorist attacks on Israel by Hamas; and thousands of protests organized by 
Palestinians.  
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Apart from this, another pressing issue is the city of Jerusalem, claimed by both Jews 
and Palestinians because of its religious and historical connotation and significance to 
both sides. Although the city is under Israeli control, Palestinians strive for the 
establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Upon its creation in 1948, 
Israel declared West Jerusalem as its capital, but it extended control over the entire city 
in 1967. From the viewpoint of the policymakers in Israel, the annexation of East 
Jerusalem was imperative as the country had to defend itself against Jordanian attack. In 
addition, the Knesset passed a bill in 1980, giving Israel the official unassailable right to 
the whole Jerusalem. Moreover, the government also started (re)settling Jews in the east 
of the city, which has had a double effect. Firstly, these settlements surround and isolate 
Palestinians areas. Secondly, they cut off these areas from the West Bank (Dumper, 
2013: 127).  
Furthermore, the Israeli government began the construction of a separation wall in East 
Jerusalem to isolate it from the West Bank. In this light, the authorities have claimed 
that this was a security measure taken to block suicide bombers that were entering the 
city from the West Bank. For Palestinians, however, the barrier has brought about 
serious financial losses as the labour force was cut off access from Jerusalem to the 
West Bank and vice versa. It also resulted in the displacement of even more Palestinians 
as well as in a major drawback for the political settlement of the issue of Jerusalem 
(Ibid: 128).  
To sum up, while the Israeli government and many Jews consider the possession of the 
entire city to be their inalienable right, Palestinians regard the annexation of East 
Jerusalem as illegal and most of residents of the city boycott local elections. On top of 
this, they demand Israeli withdrawal from the eastern part of the city and the recognition 
of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Apart from this, alternative models have 
been proposed by various local and external actors, but the parties have not seen any 
convergence of opinions over the future of Jerusalem. 
Besides Jerusalem, the Israeli policy of building Jewish settlements also occurs in the 
West Bank. The government started building these settlements after the Six-Day War of 
1967. Within a year, fourteen settlements had already been constructed (Barzilai, 2002). 
Although these settlements were founded by individuals without the official 
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authorization from the Israeli government, they still relied heavily on the backing from 
governmental and army officials (Amnesty International, 2017: 2). These settlements, 
nonetheless, have come at a huge price for Palestinians. Israel began displacing 
Palestinian communities, expropriating land and evicting them from their homes, 
denying them access to water, land and other resources, with not only the Israeli 
military, but also the new Jewish settlers attacking Palestinians (Ibid: 3).  Besides these 
official settlements, there are currently around 100 illegal outposts that have been built 
without the governmental authorization (B’Tselem, 2017). For these reasons, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip are referred to as the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) by 
by the international community. As the current PM has stated that Israel is not going to 
uproot any more settlements (McKernan, 2017), this issue remains one of the most 
problematic, hindering any possible political resolution of the conflict.  
Another major point of contestation between the parties is the question of Palestinian 
refugees – displaced people, who fled or were driven away from their homes as a result 
of armed confrontations since 1948 and whose number adds up to around 5.4 million 
(UNRWA, 2017: 1). The experience of displacement and forceful exile has become a 
part of the national identity of Palestinians. Logically enough, they call for the 
recognition of and the compensation for their plight in the form of their return to their 
homes. For Israelis, however, the issue of Palestinian refugees is connected to the 
unpleasant events that accompanied the establishment of their state in 1948. On top of 
this, they perceive the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel as a threat to the existence 
and the survival of Israel as a Jewish state (Brynen, 2013: 109).  
Furthermore, there are fundamental differences between the ways the parties look at the 
causing factors for the problem. On the one hand, Israel has maintained that Palestinians 
were not forced out from their houses and they left either by choice or at the command 
of Arab leaders and that the war itself broke out because they refused to accept the 
creation of a Jewish state. Hence, Palestinians are to blame for their distress (Ibid: 110). 
Palestinians, on the other hand, consider all this to have resulted from deliberate Zionist 
policies, which also brought about ethnic cleansing (Ibid). What is more, the advocates 
of their right to return argue that Palestinians are entitled to such a right under 
international human rights law and under the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 
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(III), which states that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” (UNGA 
Resolution 194(III), 1949). By contrast, Israel has regarded the document as a mere 
recommendation and not a binding resolution.  
In conclusion, the official position of the Palestinian Authority (PA) calls upon Israel to 
allow the refugees to return to their homes where possible. On top of this, it also 
demands from Israel the compensation of the losses these people have suffered and the 
acknowledgement of the responsibility of Israel in their plight. Israel, however, 
considers that there is no such “right” in the first place. Instead, refugees could 
repatriate to the Palestinian state or be settled outside and Israel, at most, could take in 
only a symbolic number of Palestinians for family reunification (Brynen, 2013: 113). 
Even though official negotiations about the permanent status of the issue were going on 
in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, all the talks eventually came to a halt. Due 
to the end of negotiations and such a serious disagreement about one of the core matters 
of the conflict, the issue of Palestinians refugees remains one of the most pressing to 
this day.  
Last but not least, another significant problem is the situation in the Gaza Strip. 
Although Israel had begun the construction of settlements after the war of 1967 in Gaza 
as well, as part of the Disengagement Plan, these settlements were dismantled in 2005, 
which put an end to its 38-year presence. The supporters of the Plan considered this 
move to have been a turning point in the peace process and that it would set the 
foundations for the Palestinian state (Peters, 2013: 196). However, all this proved to be 
an illusion as Hamas, a group deemed as a terrorist organization not only by Israel, but 
also the Western community, won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council 
shortly after the disengagement. In response, Israel imposed sanctions on the movement 
of people and good into and out of Gaza. After its victory, clashes between Hamas and 
its competitor in the elections – Fatah – began. As a result, Hamas took control of the 
entire Gaza Strip and Fatah became the ruling party of PA, which remained in the West 
Bank. Following this, Israel imposed a full-scale economic embargo over Gaza, which 
is still in place today. What is more, the international community has directed its 
financial and diplomatic resources to the West Bank only. As a consequence of all the 
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above-mentioned, the Gaza Strip is effectively cut off from the outside world and the 
Palestinian society is divided into two political blocks. To make the matters worse, out 
of 1.9 million of the entire population of Gaza, 1.3 million are refugees living in a 
steadily declining sociopolitical environment (UNRWA, 2016). In conclusion, the 
refusal of the Israeli government to cooperate with Hamas over the settlement of the 
conflict, as well as periodical terrorist attacks from Hamas on Israel also contributes to 
the intractability of the conflict.  
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3. Research Methodology  
3.1. Mapping the CSOs Involved in the Peace-building Process 
 
First and foremost, is necessary to mark the difference between civil society and CSOs. 
Civil society is a broader term referring to a particular phenomenon, a specific social 
sphere, while CSOs are organizational manifestations of civil society, i.e. CSOs reflect 
concrete areas of civil society, constituting only one aspect of the numerous elements of 
this phenomenon (Gidron, Bar and Katz, 2004: 142). CSOs themselves can be further 
defined as a wide array of NGOs, non-profit organizations, different forms of 
associations, unions or think tanks based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, or 
religious matters (Forster and Mattner, 2006: 2). Thus, CSOs are not the same as NGOs, 
but the latter is a part of the former.   
Before moving on to the selected CSOs, a few words about the broader civil society 
sphere in Israel and Palestine should be mentioned. Israeli civil society sector is one of 
the largest in the world in terms of its contributions to the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the number of persons employed. In this light, it ranks lower than 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada but higher than countries like the UK, Ireland and 
even the US (Corella and Noon, 2013: 14). It is difficult to state the exact number of 
CSOs currently existing in Israel for two reasons. Firstly, the last comprehensive study 
about the Israeli third sector was conducted by the European Commission in 2013. 
Secondly, the official Registry of Associations does not indicate which CSOs are 
definitely active. Nevertheless, when the Law of Associations was adopted in Israel in 
1980, 49 900 organizations registered under it and the number of active organizations 
according to different sources as of 2013, were estimated between 66% and 70% of all 
the registered ones, i.e. between 32 934 and 34 930 (Ibid: 15). As for the Palestinian 
civil society, it is far more mediocre than that of Israel. The main reasons for this are 
lack of funding, unstable state institutions and the conflict with Israel, which affects 
everyday lives of those living in East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza, not to mention 
CSO functioning. The latest study about Palestinian civil society was conducted by the 
EU External Action Service in 2015, according to which, there were 2 793 CSOs in 
Palestine in that year (Costantini, Salameh and Issa, 2015: 8).  
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However, the CSOs that the thesis looks at were selected based on three criteria: 
functionality (what their goals are), performance (the work they have done to achieve 
these goals) and credibility (public and official-level perceptions towards them). In 
terms of their functionality, the CSOs that aim at bringing the Israeli and Palestinian 
people together, ending Israeli occupation and achieving the adoption a two-state 
solution, have been selected. If we talk about their performance, the organizations that 
have managed to mobilize masses, unite the parties around common issues, build public 
support and press the two governments to consent to different peace initiatives, have 
been chosen. As for their credibility, it is also linked with performance. The facts that 
these organizations have received public support and have pressured their own 
governments, speak to their credibility. What is more, even though a lot of activities of 
CSOs go unnoticed by the general public due to lack of media coverage, the 
organizations that have received the biggest spotlight have been selected. They are 
characterized in different types: Grassroots Organizations – organizations that involve 
the ordinary citizens and non-officials and that work for building peace by familiarizing 
Israelis and Palestinians with each other and bringing them closer together through joint 
activities, dialogues and intercultural exchange; Resistance Movements – those that 
attempt to end the conflict by organizing non-violent demonstrations, protests and 
rallies to force the governments to resolve the conflict; Informants – those that 
disseminate information about human rights violations and other atrocities of the 
conflict, trying to end the conflict by influencing local, as well as international, public 
opinion and turning it towards peace, which will, in turn, serve as the basis for conflict 
resolution; Politically Involved Organizations – those that advocate different political 
solutions to the conflict and serve as forums for dialogue between officials and non-
officials; and Mixed Organizations – those that combine grassroots activities with 
information dissemination, political involvement or non-violent resistance (Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1 – The categorization of the CSOs 
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for Peace  
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resistance) 
Friends of 
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International 
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(resistance, political 
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dissemination) 
FAB Ta’ayush  PPC 
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(grassroots work and 
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dissemination) 
Friendship 
Village 
  
Two States 
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Wi’am  
(grassroots work and 
resistance) 
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dissemination) 
PPI    
WWP 
 (resistance and 
political 
involvement) 
Peres Center      
Road to 
Recovery 
    
Sadaka-Reut     
Seeds of Peace     
 
3.2. Research Design and Methods 
 
The thesis will employ Single Case Study as its research design. In particular, it will 
rely on Process Tracing (PT) which implies a systematic examination of evidence that 
has been selected and analyzed in the light of the research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the researcher (Collier, 2011, 823). A key building block for PT is description. 
More precisely, PT does analyze changes and causation but the whole analysis fails if 
the phenomena have not been properly described at every stage.  Moreover, causal 
inferences heavily depend on careful description (Collier, 2011, 824).  
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The main research question of the thesis is the following: what is the role of CSOs in 
peace-building in the case of Israel-Palestine conflict? What is more, the thesis will also 
attempt to answer these additional questions: what are the limits of CSOs? Does the 
case illustrate common impediments to Track Two efforts in all intractable conflicts? 
What are the lessons to be learned? The main argument of the thesis is that although 
CSOs can mobilize public support for peace-building, bring people from the conflicting 
parties closer and contribute to their reconciliation, they have only limited effect on 
official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution.  
As the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict have already been selected, their 
role needs to be measured. For these, the thesis will apply the framework put forward by 
Nathaniel Allen and Travis Sharp (Allen and Sharp, 2017), which presents five different 
indicators: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
Inputs  
Inputs are raw materials that create Track Two Diplomacy, such as funding, expertise, 
relationships and personnel (Allen and Sharp, 2017: 20). This implies the very basis, the 
inception of Track Two Diplomacy efforts. These can be measured by exploring the 
web pages of the selected CSOs and different databases.  
Activities 
Activities are the actions taken by Track Two moderators (in our case CSOs) during the 
peace-building process (Ibid). This indicator is also easily measurable because, again, 
the web pages of the selected CSOs will be sufficient.  
Outputs  
Outputs are tangible and intangible micro-level changes that result from Track Two 
activities (Ibid). These outputs are intrinsically linked with the general role that Track 
Two Diplomacy can play in peace-building. Allen and Sharp identify four different 
outputs in these terms: 1) idea generation; 2) building relationships; 3) effective 
moderation; and 4) changing perceptions. Each of these is a hypothesized causal 
mechanism which can actually lead to conflict resolution (Ibid: 21).  
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In order to measure these, surveys and, where possible, interviews with the 
representatives of the CSOs have been carried out.3 This enabled us to find out whether 
new ideas were generated as a result of Track Two efforts. They will also reveal 
whether the views of the participants have changed as a result of Track Two activities. 
Nevertheless, whether CSOs have played a role in the peace-building process of the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict depends on how often different outputs have occurred. More 
precisely, the frequency of the occurrence of an output directly correlates with the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the role of CSOs. In other words, to conclude that 
these organizations have managed to generate ideas, change perceptions, build 
relationships or moderate effectively, they have to have done these frequently. Thus, in 
those cases where in-depth interviews were not possible, the survey questionnaires 
asked the respondents to indicate how often certain outputs have occurred by choosing a 
number, which correlates with frequency: 0 – never, 1 – very rarely; 2-3 – rarely; 4-6 – 
sometimes; 7-8 – often; 9 – very often and 10 – always. 4 
Outcomes  
Outcomes are the benefits that Track Two project is designed to deliver (Ibid: 20)). This 
means that they are the ideas transferrable to Track One. As one of the most important 
purposes of Track Two approach is to transfer its outputs to Track One, the outcomes of 
its efforts revolve around these processes. Allen and Sharp have come up with four 
outcomes that a successful Track Two approach could achieve. 1) Official Participation, 
which means that government officials personally participated in or observed a Track 
Two activity. It was measured by asking the representatives of the selected CSOs 
whether and how often personal participation in a dialogue has actually occurred. 2) 
Officials Learn Directly, which indicates that Track Two participants informed 
governmental negotiators about Track Two outputs directly. It was measured by finding 
                                                          
3 The respondents include Brian Reeves (22.03.2018); Shimri Negbi (22.03.2018); Beate Zilversmidt 
(23.03.2018); Ruth Atzman (23.03.2018); Amit Gilutz (29.03.2018); Nidal Foqaha (02.04.2018); Avner 
Dinur (11.04.2018); Ami Yares (11.04.2018); Oren Yiftachel (12.04.2018); Zoughbi Alzoughbi 
(14.04.2018);  Ziv Stahl (15.04.2018); Assat Zamir (15.04.2018); Jeff Halper (16.04.2018); Karen Doubilet 
(17.04.2018); Baruchi Malewich (18.04.2018); and Guy Hircefeled (18.04.2018).  
4 The organizations that participated in the survey Crossing Borders (23.03.2018); The Abraham Fund 
Initiatives (27.03.2018); Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership (28.03.2018); OneVoice 
International (31.03.2018); Peres Center for Peace and Innovation (12.04.2018); Friends of Roots 
(12.04.2018); Seeds of Peace (12.04.2018); Coalition of Women for Peace (14.04.2018); Friendship 
Village (16.04.2018); Women Wage Peace (19.04.2018).  
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out about the existence of any written reports or oral briefings, and, additionally, with 
interviews with CSOs representatives. 3) Officials Learn Indirectly, which implies that 
Track Two participants inform key stakeholders about their outputs who, then, in turn 
inform governmental officials. It was measured in the same way as the 2nd outcome. 
Lastly, 4) Officials Pressured Publicly, which entails Track Two participants going 
public to pressure officials to adopt their ideas and was measured by looking at whether 
these CSOs have organized any demonstrations or other events attracting wide media 
coverage (Ibid: 26-27).  
Impacts  
Impacts are higher-level strategic goals, such as implementing new approaches to 
resolve a conflict. It entails instances of officials changing their behaviour as a result of 
the outcomes of Track Two Diplomacy (Ibid: 21-27). The difference between outcomes 
and impacts is that outcomes are the instances of successful transfer of Track Two 
outputs to Track One, while impacts are the altered behaviour of governmental officials 
in response to these outcomes. Allen and Sharp identify two types of impacts that Track 
Two efforts can produce: 1) Observed Behaviour, indicating that governmental peace 
negotiations have started acting in ways consistent with Track Two Diplomacy outputs; 
2) Official Confirmation, meaning that governmental negotiators have confirmed that 
they have acted in a certain way because of something they learned from Track Two 
outputs (Ibid: 27). Both of these have been measured by looking at Track One level 
activities and comparing them with Track Two outputs. More precisely, the instances of 
the adoption of the ideas produced by Track Two activities were indicative of Official 
Confirmation, while their actual implementation indicated Observed Behaviour.   
To sum up, the logical chain of the role of Track Two approach to intractable conflicts 
is the following: it begins with the creation of the basis for Track Two activities 
(inputs); it continues with the efforts Track Two practitioners make (activities); then 
come the results these activities are trying to achieve (outputs); followed by the 
instances of successful transfer of these outputs to Track Two (outcomes); concluding 
by the instances of officials altering their behaviour as a result of these outcomes 
(impacts).   
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3.3. Data and Sources 
 
The thesis uses a variety of sources. For its theoretical foundation, i.e. Track Two 
Diplomacy, books and scholarly articles have been used. For the overview process and 
the overview of the Israel-Palestine conflict, books, scholarly articles, news articles and 
UN Resolutions were looked at. For selecting the CSOs that work for peace-building, 
apart from their websites, different media sources, as well as articles and books, 
referring to these organizations, along with studies by conducted by the EU, were also 
investigated, which served the purpose of choosing the ones with best track records 
according to predefined criteria. As for the empirical part, the websites for the selected 
CSOs were the most important source, but various articles, leaflets and studies that 
review the impact of these organizations, were also of good use.  
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4. Measuring the Role of the Selected CSOs 
4.1. Grassroots Organizations 
 
Inputs 
The CSOs in this category attempt to build peace by fostering close interactions 
between Jews and Palestinians. More precisely, they promote values like tolerance, 
solidarity, mutual understanding and coexistence, while also working for breaking 
stereotypes, changing the perceptions that the two peoples have towards each other, 
encouraging dialogue and for creating young leaders that will strive to bring about 
social and political changes and to transform the conflict via bi-national partnership.  
This category mostly includes Israeli and foreign CSOs, but they conduct joint activities 
with Palestinians. All of them except the Arab-Jewish Community Center (AJCC) are 
financed from foreign governmental sources, mainly the EU and the US, and private 
funds from these countries (NGO Monitor, 2017). The AJCC, however, is funded from 
the Tel Aviv Municipality because it is an affiliate of the municipality (AJCC, 2018). 
Most of the CSOs in this category were founded in the 1990s and the beginning of 
2000s, being very experienced in educational programs, trust and solidarity-building 
projects, dialogue meetings and other activities aimed at the reconciliation of the two 
peoples. The oldest of these organizations is Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Partnership, 
established in 1983 (Sadaka-Reut, 2018), while the newest is Friends of Roots (Roots), 
founded in 2014 (Roots, 2018). Furthermore, the CSOs in this category have a large 
network of connections, partnering with a lot of local and international peace-building 
organizations, as well as foreign governments. The only exception is the AJCC, which 
only partners with local communities as it is an affiliate of the Tel Aviv municipality 
(AJCC, 2018). Last but not least, all the Israeli-Palestinian CSOs are staffed with both 
Jews and Palestinians, while international organizations are comprised of people from 
all the conflicting regions. 
While the majority of the grassroots CSOs focus on conducting dialogues, workshops, 
educational programs and leadership trainings to foster discussions about each other’s 
narratives and the possibilities of peace-building, the AJCC, Heartbeat, PeacePlayers, 
the Peres Center and Road to Recovery use a different method. More precisely, the 
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AJCC unites the participants of its activities into choirs and other arts groups, which 
serves the purpose of fostering positive interactions in a free environment, during which 
these participants become close to the “other side of the conflict” (Ibid). Heartbeat also 
uses music to unite its members, mainly youngsters, in ensembles, which helps them to 
build relationships (Heartbeat, 2018).   
The Peres Center and PeacePlayers are similar in a sense that they use sports to unite its 
participants in mixed teams, which teaches them the ways to work jointly instead of 
competing with each other, which also helps them to build partnerships. However, the 
Road to Recovery is a unique organization in Israel, since it transports Palestinian 
patients to and from Israeli hospitals (Road to Recovery, 2018). Besides actually 
helping those in need, the organization explicitly aims to change the perceptions Jews 
and Palestinians have towards each other and help them build new friendships (Ibid).  
Activities 
The CSOs in this category are engaged in multiple types of programs, such as 
dialogues, workshops, seminars and other unofficial meetings; joint arts and musical 
projects; sports; technology; medicine and healthcare; solidarity and support; trauma 
relief; fight against racism; spreading the message; and projects under which Jews and 
Palestinians live together. Even though, their competence area covers other spheres as 
well, dialogues, workshops, seminars and similar unofficial meetings is the field in 
which almost every CSO from this category is engaged in.  
To begin with, Crossing Borders solely focuses on dialogues and unofficial meetings 
between Jews and Palestinians, as well as Europeans. Its activities mainly include 
workshops and seminars for youth, teachers, media activists and journalists, during 
which they acquire new skills, interact closely and form positive attitudes and 
impressions. CB has organized different workshops in 2006-09, in which Israeli and 
Palestinian youngsters as well as participants from other countries have taken part, 
discussing the opportunities of civil society for building peace (CB, 2006: 17), the ways 
to manage the conflict as well as acquired new skills for handling crises (CB, 2007: 1), 
the prospect of breaking barriers and bringing the peoples together (CB, 2008: 4), or 
ideas for restoring trust between Israelis and Palestinians after the Gaza War (Ibid: 6). 
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Since 2009, however, Crossing Borders has directed its attention towards other parts of 
the world, mainly Africa and South-East Asia. Therefore, we do not see any longer 
activities focusing on the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
The Arab-Jewish Community Center encourages intercultural cooperation, tolerance, 
friendship, and trust between Jews and Palestinians. It runs the Youth Parliament 
Program, which gathers 40 Jewish and Palestinian high school students for weekly 
round-table discussions and leadership activities. The participants acquire new skills to 
become leaders and promote values like trust and tolerance. In addition, they plan 
community events and shoot an end-of-the-year movie together (AJCC, 2018). 
Similarly to the AJCC, Friends of Roots also works for building trust and 
understanding. Under Community Programming, Roots organizes small events, learning 
groups or lectures, in which religious communities (Jews, Christians and Muslims) take 
part. The participants talk about the differences and similarities between their religions, 
which serves the purpose of dispelling stereotypes and finding common ground (Roots, 
2018). Under Youth Programming, Roots brings together university students who 
discuss each other’s narratives and the possibilities for peace. As part of the After-
School Program, Israeli and Palestinian children take part in photography and painting 
workshops, where they form connections with each other and get rid of fear and 
distance (Ibid).   
Values like mutual understanding, tolerance, respect and acceptance are also in the 
focus of Friendship Across Borders, which engages its participants in discussions and 
dialogue about the issues of the conflict, the responsibility of each of the parties as well 
as the possibilities for achieving peace (FAB, 2018). Like FAB, Friendship Village also 
works for spreading the principles of tolerance and respect in the Israeli society. Under 
its project Woman Educators for Peace and Human Rights, which started in 2005, 
young women (mainly students) from Israel and Palestine attend lectures about inter-
cultural encounter, each other’s religions, narratives and everyday lives, which helps to 
foster mutual understating and humanize “the other” (Friendship Village, 2007). Apart 
from people-to-people meetings, Friendship Village also conducts dialogues with 
officials. In particular, its project Talk Peace – Make Peace (TPMP), which was 
initiated in 2005, brings together ten Israeli Jewish, ten Israeli Arab and ten Palestinian 
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young politicians and social leaders to overcome the emotional aspects of the conflict, 
such as fear, hatred, mistrust and hostility (Ibid).  
Last but not least, Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Partnership runs an annual project 
Gemini – Partners in Shaping Reality, which unites around 150 Jewish and Palestinian 
students from different campuses, who engage in dialogue with each other mostly in 
mixed cities and areas where the two peoples meet one another most often. The project 
creates a shared space for discussions about the issues related to the conflict and 
relations between Jews and Palestinians (Sadaka-Reut, 2012: 6).  
Furthermore, the grassroots CSOs also allocate great deal of attention to leadership 
programs. In other words, different organizations conduct projects to create leaders that 
will work for conflict transformation. Firstly, Friendship Across Borders runs a 
multidimensional training program targeting youngsters aged 20-26 from Israel, 
Palestine and Germany and educating them to become peace carriers. These are the 
people that work in their own societies and communities, promoting peace, mutual 
understanding, tolerance, acceptance, respect and for changing attitudes towards “the 
other” (FAB, 2018). Secondly, Sadaka-Reut runs a project Community in Action, which 
involves around fifteen-twenty Jewish and Palestinian youngsters, who themselves 
educate schoolchildren and organize campaigns like erasing racist graffiti from the 
streets and exhibitions about the problems of Palestinian refugees (Sadaka-Reut, 2018). 
Not only does the project create bi-national activists and leaders, but it also provides 
them with the skills to strive for positive changes within their communities. Finally, 
Seeds of Peace runs local youth conventions called GATHER-s, during which the 
participants exchange ideas and experiences about the most pressing issues of the 
conflict and contemplate the opportunities for their inclusion in conflict resolutions.  
Apart from the above-mentioned fields, arts play a very important role for bringing 
Jews and Palestinians together. Specifically, some of the CSOs in this category use 
music, photography, painting and similar spheres to unite the participants of their 
activities, while contributing to their rapprochement and providing them with a space 
for positive interaction. Firstly, Heartbeat runs a core program Artist and Ensemble 
Development, which brings together Jewish and Palestinian youngsters (aged 14-20) 
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every week, who explore each other’s cultures and narratives by discussing, engaging in 
critical dialogue and positively interacting with each other (Heartbeat, 2018).   
Secondly, AJCC runs Choir Programs, which include three different choirs – women’s, 
youth’s and children’s. The choirs sing different songs in Hebrew, Arabic and English. 
This helps the singers to overcome cultural and ethnic division and serve as an example 
to other mixed communities (AJCC, 2018). All this helps them to get exposed to “the 
other” at an early age with positive attitude and interaction, while also bridge cultural 
and religious gaps (Ibid). Last but not least, the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation 
uses the power of arts and photography as a means of creative expression of emotions, 
fears and hopes. This allows these feelings to be understood better and misperceptions 
to be tackled with more effectively. The projects in this sphere include photography 
workshops, visual arts exhibitions and similar activities, during which the participants 
interact closely and positively and build trust (Peres Center, 2018).  
Besides arts and music, sports is another field that is frequently used by some grassroots 
CSOs as a uniting factor for Jews and Palestinians under a common goal of winning a 
game, helping each other and building friendships. Specifically, the Peres Center runs 
Twinned Peace Sports Schools project, which was launched in 2002 and still continues. 
Each year, over 1 500 Jewish and Palestinian children take part in joint activities and 
events, playing in mixed teams instead of against each other, which serves the purpose 
of breaking barriers and stereotypes and building trust among the participants (Peres 
Center, 2018). Besides sport training, the project also aims to encourage Jewish and 
Palestinian youngsters to volunteer as “peace ambassadors” in their communities and 
spread the values of social change and peace-building and implement peace education 
through sport, using the leadership skills they acquire as a result of this project (Ibid). 
Along with the Peres Center, PeacePlayers International also links sports, namely 
basketball, with peace-building. Its project PPI – Middle East combines year-round 
sports programs with peace-building and involves children, youth and coaches, 
providing them with a framework for positive interaction, building friendships and 
partnerships, eradicating negative attitudes and acquiring skills for becoming 
community leaders that promote peace (PPI, 2017: 2).  
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Moreover, medicine and healthcare work in the same way as arts and sports. In 
particular, the projects of the Peres Center train Palestinian doctors and provide 
Palestinian children with treatment in Israeli hospitals, which serve as bridges for peace-
building, changing perceptions and positive interactions (Peres Center, 2018).  In the 
same manner, the volunteers at Road to Recovery transport Palestinian patients and 
their family members to Israeli hospitals and back home. Besides transportation, Road 
to Recovery also helps Palestinians receive different types of surgeries and obtain 
medical equipment, as well as involve them in various recreational activities.  (Road to 
Recovery, 2018). Road to Recovery believes that its activities demonstrate to both sides 
that life in the region is not only about enmity, violence and conflict, but about peace, 
assistance, humanity and mutual understanding and that all this can contribute to peace-
building (Ibid).  
In addition to all this, some of the CSOs in this category are active in fields that are only 
characteristic to them, making them the only ones in the category that run these 
activities. More precisely, Friends of Roots runs projects, under which, the speakers 
from the organization visit different families across Israel and Palestine and attempt to 
engage them in their work and in spreading messages of peace. The organization also 
runs Pre-Army Academies, which are attended by Israelis before going to compulsory 
military service. The attendees are exposed to both Palestinians’ and settlers’ narratives 
and prepare for the experience they will be having with these people during their 
service.  Moreover, the representatives of Roots visit schools in across Israel and 
Palestine to present their view to schoolchildren, so that they can grow up with changed 
perceptions and become more open towards “the other” and peace, in general (Roots, 
2018). Friendship Across Borders is also distinguished because it holds sessions, during 
which Jews and Palestinians discuss their personal stories connected to the conflict and 
work for relieving trauma and restoring trust (from the interview, 11.04.2018). 
Last but not least, the Peres Center is also distinct from other CSOs because it runs  
Peace Computer Centers, which involves youth aged 13-16 from twelve communities 
across Israel and the West Bank, who participate in regular online discussion forums. 
The virtual meetings take place once a week, exposing the participants to the narratives 
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of the “other.” After a year of online communication, the youngsters meet face to face, 
building ever stronger friendships (Peres Center, 2018).  
Outputs 
Due to the competence area of the selected CSOs, generating new ideas about how to 
build peace or solve the conflict are not the primary focus of their activities. 
Nevertheless, it still happens sometimes as a result of the dialogue meetings, workshops 
and other discussions aimed at exploring the narratives of the parties and discussing the 
possibilities for coexistence and conflict resolution. The AJCC aims at fostering close 
interactions between the two peoples as well as empowering youth to become leaders 
and promoters of values like tolerance, trust and respect. Thus, during its roundtable 
meetings between Jewish and Palestinian youth, new ideas are sometimes generated 
about the ways in which these values can be spread (from the interview, 15.04.2018). 
Similarly, Seeds of Peace is also engaged in creating leaders that will work for conflict 
transformation. Hence, its activities sometimes generate new ideas about the 
mechanisms though which the conflict can be transformed (from the survey, 
12.04.2018). Unlike Seeds of Peace, Friends of Roots only works for encouraging 
interaction between Israelis and Palestinians but as it organizes dialogues between 
different groups, new ideas about the ways in which to eradicate the problems that 
hinder rapprochement between these two peoples are still sometimes generated (from 
the survey, 12.04.2018). Last but not least, even though Crossing Borders aims at 
finding new political solutions to the conflict as well as fostering close interactions 
between Jews and Palestinians, its activities only sometimes produce new ideas (from 
the survey, 23.03.2018). This can be explained by the fact that CB is not as actively 
engaged in the conflict as other CSOs in this category and, thus, has only worked with 
small groups (around 25 people).  
Unlike the above-mentioned CSOs, the organizations, the representatives of which have 
indicated that their activities have often produced new ideas are Friendship Village and 
Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership. As both of these organizations work for 
educating Jewish and Palestinian youth about cross-cultural coexistence as well as the 
importance of bi-national partnership for peace-building, their activities frequently 
generate new ideas about ways in which interactions between the two peoples can be 
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deepened (from the survey, 28.03.2018 and 16.04.2018). However, as Heartbeat, 
PeacePlayers and the Peres Center are all oriented towards using music and sports 
activities as means for uniting Jews and Palestinians, idea generation is not their focus. 
Despite this, as dialogue meetings and leadership training are parts of their activities, 
new ideas are still generated, but rarely (from the interviews, 11.04.2018 and 
17.04.2018 and from the survey, 12.04.2018). On the contrary, Friendship Across 
Borders works for relieving trauma and other psychological aspects, due to which, its 
activities do not generate new ideas (from the interview, 11.04.2018). Similarly, Road 
to Recovery attempts to contribute to peace-building by uniting Israeli volunteers to 
transport Palestinian patients to and from Israeli hospitals. Thus, idea generation is out 
of the focus of this organization as well.   
Building relationships is the aspect most of the CSOs in this category have good track 
records of. This is quite logical, as it is one of the primary foci of the activities of these 
organizations. As the AJCC and PeacePlayers concentrate on creating joint teams of 
Israelis and Palestinians, be it choirs in the case of the former and basketball teams in 
the case of the latter, the participants of the activities of these two organizations have 
very often built relationships as they spend a lot of time together as teammates (from the 
interviews, 15.04.2018 and 17.04.2018). Similarly, Friends of Roots runs summer 
camps for Jewish and Palestinian youngsters, as a result of which, the participants have 
very often built friendships (from the survey, 12.04.2018). Unlike these three 
organizations, Sadaka-Reut does not work for creating  joint groups, but it has different 
long-standing projects, which have brought together Jews and Palestinians for seminars, 
workshops and tours for years, as well as anti-racism campaigns. As a result of these 
activities, its participants have also very often built partnerships and friendships (from 
the survey, 28.03.2018). In the same manner, Friendship Village has also included the 
two peoples in joint projects for years, which have very often helped the partakers to 
become partners in organizing similar projects themselves. 
Team-building has also proven successful for Heartbeat, the Peres Center and Seeds of 
Peace, as the participants of its activities have always built new relationships. More 
precisely, as Heartbeat runs different ensembles, in which Jews and Palestinians play 
music together, as well as travel around the country and sometimes abroad together, its 
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members always build friendships (from the interview, 11.04.2018). What is more, the 
Peres Center has a lot of different teams of children and youngsters, who meet virtually 
as well as face to face. Therefore, the members of these teams also always build 
friendships and partnerships for new joint campaigns (from the survey, 12.04.2018). In 
addition, the participants of Seeds of Peace always build friendships as well, since the 
organization runs an annual summer camp, in which Israelis and Palestinians live 
together. As mentioned earlier, Road to Recovery is unique in its functionality and does 
not organize group activities. However, its members have still often built friendships as 
those who transport Palestinian patients to hospitals frequently visit them even after 
their recovery (Road to Recovery video, 2014). Unlike the aforementioned 
organizations, the representatives of Friendship Across Borders and Crossing Borders 
have indicated that the participants of their activities have only sometimes built new 
relationships (from the interview, 11.04.2018 and from the survey, 23/03/2018). This 
can be explained by the fact that FAB works for reliving trauma and changing 
perceptions rather than forming new relationships, while CB brings together Danish, 
Finnish and German youngsters with Jews and Palestinians, which makes it difficult to 
build long-lasting friendships.  
In most cases, effective moderation and perception changes are intrinsically linked and 
the former leads to the latter. In other words, the CSOs, whose representatives have 
indicated that their moderations have been very effective, have also stated that their 
participants have always changed perceptions towards each other as well as various 
aspects of the conflict. These CSOs include Friendship Across Borders, Heartbeat, the 
Peres Center and Seeds of Peace. It should be mentioned, however, that the perception 
changes that Heartbeat and the Peres Center have brought about do not only come down 
to effective moderation, but also to the time the participants of its activities spend 
together in the teams. In the same manner, the CSOs that have had effective or mostly 
effective moderations, have demonstrated that their activities very often change 
perceptions. The only CSOs that has altered the perceptions of its members without any 
moderation at all, is Road to Recovery, whose Israeli members voluntarily transport 
Palestinian patients. Therefore, the latter always change the perceptions they previously 
had towards Israelis, while the former’s attitudes are also altered as a result of the 
experience (Road to Recovery video, 2014). Another exception is Crossing Borders, 
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whose representative indicated that the moderations of this organization have been 
ineffective and, thus, the attendees of its projects have only sometimes changed their 
perceptions (from the survey, 23.03.2018.) This can be explained by the fact that CB’s 
projects only last for a few days and take place only two-three times a year. 
Outcomes 
The majority of the CSOs in this category are oriented towards people-to-people level 
than towards the official level. Therefore, their role is limited to Outputs. Those that did 
produce any outcomes include Crossing Borders, Friendship Village, Sadaka-Reut – 
Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership and Seeds of Peace. Only two CSOs have informed 
officials directly about the ideas that were generated by their activities and these 
officials are limited to young and emerging politicians in the case of Sadaka-Reut, 
which has only sometimes informed them directly (from the survey, 28.03.2018), and 
young politicians and those working in the ministries in the case of Crossing Borders, 
which has often informed them directly (23.03.2018).  
Officials have sometimes been informed indirectly about the ideas generated by the 
activities of Seeds of Peace (from the survey, 12.04.2018). As one of goals of this 
organization is to train leaders who will themselves engage in conflict transformation 
process, the graduates of its programs, who became involved in peace-building 
processes are the ones that have informed officials about these ideas. Sadaka-Reut is 
another one that has rarely indirectly informed officials about its ideas through the 
participants of the organization’s activities, who developed into social leaders (from the 
survey, 28.03.2018). As for official participation, Sadaka-Reut has demonstrated this 
outcome too, with young politicians having sometimes taken part in its activities (Ibid), 
while Friendship Village has often seen official participation in its projects (from the 
survey, 16.04.2018). One of its projects – TPMP – has  brought together young Jewish 
and Palestinian politicians and social leaders since 2005. 
Impacts 
The impact of most of the CSOs in this category ends at the level of Outputs, which is 
quite logical as the majority of them works at the grassroots level, not being oriented 
towards the governmental level. Therefore, the only CSO that has demonstrated an 
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impact in this category is Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership.  In particular, 
as the organization is very active in fighting racism in Israel, in 2012 it conducted a 
campaign “Journey Against Racism,” by which it promoted the ideas of business-free 
racism. Following this, a government office adopted the idea of business without racism 
and turned it into an ethical code (from the survey, 28.03.2018). Thus, Sadaka-Reut has 
displayed Official Confirmation as officials adopted the idea that they had learned from 
the activities of the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour, since they 
implemented it. 
4.2. Resistance Movements 
 
Inputs 
The CSOs in this category attempt to build peace by protesting against various policies 
that the Israeli government has towards Palestine. All of these organizations consider 
that Israel has illegally occupied Palestinian territories and try to end it through public 
pressure. However, they differ in what they see as occupation. While all these 
movements regard the continuous construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank 
since the 1967 war to be illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, Gush 
Shalom perceives the acquisition of territories as a result of this war to already have 
been an instance of occupation and thus, demands, that the Palestinian state be created 
within the pre-1967 borders (Gush Shalom, 2018).  
Furthermore, the right of return of Palestinian refugees is another issue that only two 
CSOs in this category focus on. In particular, only CWP and Gush Shalom have it on 
their agenda. Ta’ayush emphasizes the importance of equality of Jewish and Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, but it does not work for the acceptance of the refugees’ right to return 
per se. In addition, Ta’ayush is different from all the CSOs in this category in a sense 
that it fights racism, segregation and discrimination with different street campaigns 
(Ta’ayush, 2018). It also protests against the economic blockade of Gaza, which is also 
a goal shared by the CWP (CWP, 2018). Apart from these, the establishment of the 
Palestinian state and the division of Jerusalem is also another matter that only Gush 
Shalom and Peace Now are oriented towards. While, as already mentioned, Gush 
Shalom demands that the Palestinian state be created within the pre-1967 borders, Peace 
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Now supports the existence of Israeli and Palestinian states within the boundaries 
established after the 1967 war. As for Jerusalem, Gush Shalom promotes the idea of 
East Jerusalem becoming the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem – of Israel (Gush 
Shalom, 2018), whereas Peace now considers that the city should be divided based on 
demographic distribution (Peace Now, 2018).  
The movements in this category are entirely financed from foreign sources mainly 
European and from the US, including not only governments and IGOs, but also private 
foundations and international non-profits (NGO Monitor, 2017). The longest-standing 
CSO of them is Peace Now, founded in 1978 having held numerous demonstrations 
against occupation and settlements, as well meetings between the parties’ official and 
unofficial representatives (Peace Now, 2018). Gush Shalom is also a very experienced 
protest and solidarity movement, founded in 1993 and having been actively engaged in 
public discourse ever since. It is known for its clear stances and claims to have “played 
a leading role in determining the moral and political agenda of the peace forces in Israel, 
as well as in breaking the so-called “national consensus” based on misinformation” 
(Gush Shalom, 2018). Moreover, both CWP and Ta’ayush were founded in 2000, also 
being experienced organizations. CWP, however, is unique in the category in a sense 
that even though it was founded as an umbrella organization in 2000, the organizations 
and groups that established it date back to 1980s. CWP is famous for its clear stances 
and a large number of activities and campaigns raging from monitoring human rights 
violations to demonstrations and reconciliation programs. Its leaders have been able to 
overcome many of the obstacles that previous women-led peace organizations had in 
Israel, including the inability to tackle power asymmetries between Israelis and 
Palestinians and to cope with conflict within the organizations (Sharoni, 2012: 123). 
All the organizations in this category have regional as well as international partners. For 
that matter, CWP and Peace Now have the largest networks of connections. Besides, 
actively demonstrating against different issues connected with the conflict, CWP assists 
and empowers human rights organizations and activities worldwide, particularly 
women’s and youth groups and provides peace and social justice initiatives with 
organizational and fundraising assistance (CWP, 2017). Peace Now has an extremely 
large network of connections, being partners with not-only likeminded CSOs, but also 
44 
 
foreign governments, notably Norway, Belgium and the UK, as well human rights 
organizations, the UN and the EU, and private entities, such as the New Israeli Fund. At 
home, it has relations with the members of Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), Zionist 
unions and Palestinian NGOs (Peace Now, 2018). In addition, these two CSOs also take 
the leading roles in the category in terms of personnel. As already mentioned, CWP was 
founded by several different groups, who had previously been parts of women’s peace 
initiatives. The personnel of CWP is therefore experienced and diverse, consisting both 
of Jews and Palestinians. Peace Now, on the other hand, is the largest and the most 
diverse peace movement in Israel, with more than 10 000 members not only from Israel 
but also from the Middle East and around the world. Its work has been supported by 
hundreds of prominent academics, politicians and philosophers from the world (Peace 
Now, 2018).  
Activities 
While non-violent resistance is the primary focus of the CSOs in this category, most of 
them also concentrate on other issues, such as periodically launching campaigns for 
disseminating information about the mechanisms through which they think Israel 
occupies Palestine, as well as expressing solidarity towards affected families. To begin 
with, Coalition of Women for Peace carries out its activities in a form of continuous 
campaigns. CWP has organized numerous campaigns against the economic blockade of 
the Gaza Strip, holding mass rallies in Tel Aviv and other cities (CWP, 2010); against 
“a system of Apartheid on the entire Palestinian people,” putting up posters in metro 
stations, organizing cultural events and public lectures; and for revealing companies and 
corporations that profit from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza strip and 
the Golan Heights (Ibid). Besides these campaigns CWP has launched anti-war 
demonstrations in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The protests saw a participation 
of thousands of Israelis, with CWP providing the activists with legal support and media 
coverage.  
Secondly, as Gush Shalom is a protest and solidarity movement, targeting the media 
(opinion leaders) as well as Israeli public with campaigns and demonstrations is its main 
activity areas as well. Since 2006, Gush Shalom has organized multiple protests against 
armed confrontations between IDF and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the economic 
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blockade; against the separation wall; against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, 
settlement-building and the eviction of Palestinians from their homes and against the 
unification of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Besides these issues, Gush Shalom has 
also organized demonstrations in demand for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders; 
for the creation of a Palestinian state and for the release of illegally apprehended 
Palestinians (Gush Shalom, 2018).  
Thirdly, Peace Now is also very actively engaged in non-violent resistance against the 
Israeli policy of settlement-building, having organized hundreds of protests against it 
and also having filed petitions to the high court against illegal outposts in Amona and 
Migron. Apart from these issues, since 2006, Peace Now has demonstrated against the 
war between Israel and Lebanon; against the Israeli policies of occupation, against the 
Knesset bill that retroactively legalizes Israeli settlements and outpost in the West Bank 
and against the bill turning Israel into a Jewish nation-state. What is more, Peace Now 
has also joined demonstrations of thousands of Israelis against the government, which it 
considers “the most right-wing Israel has ever had” (Peace Now, 2016).  Apart from 
this, Peace Now has also organized rallies demanding that the government endorse a 
two-state solution and establish peace (Ibid). Besides non-violent resistance, Peace Now 
is also involved in other areas related to the conflict. More specifically, in 2015, the 
movement organized an annual conference “Israel Now – Building an Alternative,” 
which saw a record number of 1200 participants and 60 speakers (Peace Now, 2015). 
The conference was attended by the members of Knesset, civil society leaders and 
representatives of the Israeli Peace Camp (Peace Now, 2015).  
Last but not least, Ta’yush is the only movement in the category that is actively engaged 
in Solidarity and Aid Campaigns. The activists of Ta’ayush organize Consolation and 
Infrastructure Building and Re-building Visits, during which they visit the Palestinians 
whose houses or other property have been destroyed. They help these people clean the 
territories and water from rubbles as well as rebuild the demolished buildings. What is 
more, Ta’ayush also initiates campaigns to improve the existent infrastructure in the 
most underdeveloped areas. In the same domain, Ta’ayush also organizes summer 
camps for Jewish and Arab children, where they live together for summer and do joint 
activities. This helps them interact positively and form friendly attitudes towards each 
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other. Apart from this, Ta’ayush is also distinct in a sense that it is the only movement 
in the category that organizes protests against the violence that Israeli settlers show 
against Palestinians. According to the movement, neither the security police nor any 
other Israeli authority takes any actions against it. Therefore, they demonstrate and 
demand the cessation of such violence and accountability of the settlers that commit it 
and the soldiers that do not prevent it (Ta’ayush, 2017). Furthermore, the activists of 
Ta’ayush hold demonstrations against settlement-building and illegal eviction of 
Palestinians from their houses, as well as against the separation wall.   
Outputs 
Because of the competence area of these CSOs, none of the four outputs are their 
primary focus. Thus, Peace Now is the only organization that has generated new ideas 
about how to solve the conflict or build peace. Still, as it mainly works for ending the 
expansion of Jewish settlements in the OPT and most of its activities include rallies and 
demonstrations, new ideas are only rarely generated (from the interview, 22.03.2018). 
In addition, Peace Now is the only organization that has held unofficial moderations 
between the Jews and Palestinians. Because of its competence area, it does not 
frequently serve as a moderator, but when it does, its moderations are effective (Ibid).  
Moreover, Coalition of Women for Peace aims at ending the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories through demonstrations and protests. Therefore, its activities do 
not generate new ideas and the movement does not serve as a moderator for unofficial 
dialogue (from the survey, 14.04.2018). Similarly, as Ta’ayush is a protest and a 
solidarity movement, it is not concerned with finding political solutions to the conflict. 
Therefore, its activities do not generate ideas and it does not serve as a moderator, either 
(from the interview, 18.04.2018).  
Building relationships is another output none of the organizations in this category work 
for. Despite this, the participants of their activities still form new relationships, as they 
are united around the common cause and spend a lot of time in each other’s company. 
Ta’ayush leads the category in this sense, as its representative has indicated that the 
organization very often builds relationships between Jews and Palestinians because of 
the solidarity it demonstrates towards those in need (from the interview, 18.04.2018). 
Peace Now and CWP have also often built relationships between their activists because 
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they are comprised of Jews and Palestinians striving towards the same goal (from the 
interview, 22.03.2018 and from the survey, 14.04.2018).  
Last but not least, unlike grassroots organizations, perception changes are not connected 
with effective moderation in case of movements. Rather, these changes occur for the 
same reasons as new relationships are built.  In other words, while grassroots CSOs 
attempt to alter the perceptions that the participants of its activities have towards the 
other side and the conflict in general by dialogues and other types of unofficial 
meetings, movements in this category have managed to change these perceptions by 
again uniting their activists around a common cause. This is evident in the cases of 
Peace Now and CWP, whose participants have often changed their perceptions towards 
the other nation and the most pressing issues of the conflict (Ibid). Ta’ayush, however, 
is a leader in this sense as well as it always manages to change the perceptions of its 
participants. This can be explained by the fact that Ta’ayush helps Palestinians rebuild 
their houses, contrary to what many Jews do (from the interview, 18.04.2018).  
Outcomes 
As mentioned earlier, the two outputs that the CSOs in this category have demonstrated 
are building relationships and changing perceptions. However, Outcomes are linked 
with the remaining two outputs – idea generation and effective moderation. In 
particular, as two of the outcomes include officials being directly or indirectly informed 
about the ideas generated by the activities of the CSOs, absence of idea generation 
automatically means the absence of these two outcomes. In addition, because the third 
outcome concerns the participation of officials in dialogues and other activities of the 
organizations, absence of such dialogues also brings about the absence of this outcome. 
Based on all these, it is logical that the CSOs that have not generated new ideas or have 
not had effective moderations, have not demonstrated any of the above-mentioned 
outcomes either. The only exception is Peace Now, whose activities have involved 
officials, but this has happened rarely (from the interview, 22.03.2018). The officials 
mainly include the members of Meretz and other left-wing parties in the Knesset. Peace 
Now has also informed officials directly about its ideas, but this has also happened 
rarely. Moreover, the movement has also sometimes informed officials indirectly, 
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mainly through left-wing members of Knesset, who then in turn inform the governing 
right-wing elites (Ibid).  
The last outcome involves officials being pressured publicly, with the activists of these 
organizations demonstrating, protesting and organizing rallies. Thus, this is the outcome 
that all the CSOs in the category have displayed due to the fact that protests and 
demonstrations are their primary focus.  
Impacts 
As Impacts are the follow-up of Outcomes, the absence of the latter means the absence 
of the former as well. Thus, it is logical that again Peace Now is the only movement that 
has displayed any impacts. More precisely, in 2006, it filed a petition in the High Court 
against an Israeli outpost located on private Palestinian lands in Amona, which was 
accepted and nine structures were evacuated (Peace Now, 2006). What is more, in 2012, 
as a result of its campaign against the Knesset bill legalizing settlements in Migron, the 
bill failed to accumulate enough supports and was postponed (Peace Now, 2012). Last 
but not least, in 2017, Peace Now filed a complaint to the Attorney General against an 
illegal tender on Palestinian land. As a result of the complaint, this tender was abolished 
(from the interview, 22.03.2018). Hence, Peace Now has displayed Official 
Confirmation as officials adopted the idea that they had learned from the activities of 
the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour, since they implemented it.  
4.3. Informants 
 
Inputs 
The CSOs in this category disseminate information publicly, which serves the purpose 
of affecting public opinion and turning it towards peace, stimulating public debate and 
contributing to conflict resolution. All of these organizations are registered in Israel, but 
B’Tselem – the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories 
and Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights operate in OPT. They see the Israeli 
occupation as the main source of human rights violations and, thus, are mainly 
concerned with documenting human rights violations in these territories and publicizing 
them, Breaking the Silence (BtS) is an organization of veteran combatants, who served 
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in the Israeli military forces after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. The 
founders have decided to expose the Israeli and international public to the reality of life 
in the OPT (BtS, 2018).  
All the CSOs in this category are entirely financed from foreign governmental sources, 
mainly from the EU and the US, and private funds. They find it important to maintain 
their independence and not receive any direct or indirect funding from the Israeli or 
Palestinian governmental bodies (Yesh Din, 2018). The longest-standing of these CSOs 
is B’Tselem, founded in 1989. It is also extremely experienced in the field. Since its 
foundation, it has been engaged in documenting human rights violations in the OPT, 
publishing statistics of death and killings, testimonies, videos and other materials that 
expose the truth about the occupation regime, which aims to raise awareness about these 
matters locally and internationally, which itself can put an end to the occupation 
(B’Tselem, 2018). Yesh Din is quite similar to B’Tselem with its competence areas and 
activities. It was founded in 2005 and has worked for long-term improvements in 
human rights situation in the OPT, legal advocacy and raising public awareness about 
these issues. It has established itself as a professional and a reliable human rights 
organization not only locally, but also internationally (Yesh Din, 2018). As mentioned 
earlier, Breaking the Silence collects anonymous testimonies from former Israeli 
soldiers to expose the reality of the conflict and life in the OPT to the Israeli and 
international public. To do so, since its foundation in 2004, BtS has been conducting 
lectures, exhibitions, tours and other public events. Up to date, the organization has 
collected testimonies from more than a thousand combatants (BtS, 2018).  
As for the personnel and the relationships of these organizations, they are quite diverse. 
While B’Tselem is staffed with Israeli, Palestinian and international researchers, 
analysts and other employees, Yesh Din is mostly staffed with women, a majority of 
whom are volunteers. It does not present itself as a feminist organization, but it was 
founded by women (Yesh Din, 2018). Breaking the Silence on the other hand, is solely 
comprised of veteran Israeli soldiers, who themselves have experienced the reality of 
life under military control in OPT. Moreover, as all of these CSOs work on very 
sensitive topics, they have tense relations with the Israeli government, Zionists and 
other right-wing groups, but they are much supported by European governments and 
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foundations. B’Tselem, for instance, has developed a reputation among human rights 
organizations locally and internationally and is considered a reliable source, being 
widely cited. It partners with different human rights organizations in Israel and 
Palestine, as well worldwide (B’Tselem, 2017).  
Activities 
The longest-standing and the largest of Informants is B’Tselem. The primary focus of 
the organization is the documentation of human rights and IHLviolations in the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In this light, B’Tselem sends its field 
researchers to the most affected areas and also carries out different campaigns. It 
activities revolve round four main goals. Firstly, the organization provides Israeli and 
international public with information about human rights and IHL violations and ill-
treatment in the OPT. To do so, its researchers collect first-person testimonies from 
Palestinians living there and publish them. What is more, B’Tselem’s volunteer 
Palestinians have their own cameras and document these kinds of violations themselves 
as well. These videos are accepted as evidence by Israeli courts (B’Tselem, 2016). 
Secondly, the organization works for accountability for violating the rights of 
Palestinians. To achieve this goal, B’Tselem files requests for investigation to Israeli 
law enforcement authorities, most of which are opened as court cases (Ibid). Thirdly, 
B’tselem attempts to increase the media coverage of the ongoing issues in the OPT. In 
this light, the organization shoots short films and videos which cover the most urgent 
issues in terms of human rights situation in the OPT and are available to the local and 
international publics (Ibid). Finally, the organizations advocates for policy changes to 
ensure the protection of human rights in the OPT. For this, it organizes study tours and 
briefings for policy-makers, diplomats and international organizations and runs media 
campaigns regarding the Israeli occupation and the detention of Palestinians (Ibid).  
Another organization working for the documentation of human rights violations in the 
OPT is Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights.  The activities of Yesh Din are very 
similar to those of B’Tselem, but there are several main differences. First of all, while 
B’Tselem documents human rights and IHL violations perpetrated by Israeli authorities 
or IDF, Yesh Din also focuses on revealing violations committed by Jewish citizens 
against Palestinians. Secondly, whereas B’Tselem is concerned with the documentation 
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and revelation of human rights violations in total numbers, Yesh Din has a two-tiered 
approach focusing on individual cases and, where necessary, accompanying Palestinians 
to police stations as well as working at the systemic level, accumulating individual 
cases to present the whole picture (Yesh Din, 2018).  
The activities of Yesh Din go into four directions. The first one revolves around 
occupation policies. In this sphere, Yesh Din disseminates information about illegal 
Palestinian land confiscation and violence against civilian population. To do so, since 
2007, the organization publishes reports, position papers and articles, which are 
available to Israeli, Palestinian and international public. It also files petitions to the High 
Court of Israel. The second area includes settlements and outposts. In this sphere, Yesh 
Din primarily concentrates on illegal construction of Jewish settlements and outposts on 
private Palestinian lands, on eviction of Palestinians from their homes and on 
retroactively legalizing the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank. Since 
2008, the organization has filed over 40 petitions to Israeli High Court, demanding the 
cessation of illegal construction and the demolition of already-built housing units (Ibid). 
Moreover, Yesh Din started publishing reports about these issues in 2011, which are 
available for local and international public. The third field, which is also one of the 
factors that distinguishes Yesh Din from other Informants, concerns settler violence. 
this is the domain Yesh Din is most engaged in. It claims that while Israeli public is of 
the opinion that violence against Palestinians committed by Jewish settlers in the West 
Bank are extreme cases that occur very rarely, in reality, this is a widespread practice, 
which includes violence, property damage, land expropriation and other offenses (Ibid). 
Dealing with this problem is part of the organization’s two-tiered approach. Not only 
does it collect testimonies from affected Palestinians and publish reports, but it also files 
petitions to the High Court of Israel for investigation and assists individuals to submit 
their own lawsuits (where necessary, accompanies them to police stations). The final 
competence area of Yesh Din involves accountability. This is the field in which the 
activities of Yesh Din and B’Tselem have the most in common. Following Yesh Din, a 
lot of IDF soldiers often commit acts of violence against Palestinian civilians. To make 
the matters worse, they fail to fulfill their duty – protect Palestinians when the latter is 
attacked by Jewish settlers (Ibid). Therefore, the organization works to ensure the 
accountability of the perpetrators and publishes reports, articles and data sheets that are 
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publicly available. Most importantly, Yesh Din submits petitions to the High Court of 
Israel, demanding investigation of the cases or the prosecution of the perpetrators.  
Unlike B’Tselem and Yesh Din, Breaking the Silence does not only spread info about 
the ongoing violations of human rights, but it also publicizes the testimonies of former 
Israeli soldiers, which cover multiple topics besides such violations. Thus, the activities 
of Breaking the Silence fall under four categories. Firstly, BtS holds lectures about the 
realities of life in the OPT, about fighting in Gaza and in the West Bank, about female 
soldiers in Israeli Defense Force units and about the life in Hebron, a city in the West 
Bank, administered jointly by the PA and Israel. The lectures aim to provide the Israeli 
public with the truth about these four topics, which BtS considers to be “grim” (BtS, 
2018). Secondly, BtS holds photo exhibitions where former soldiers present photos they 
themselves took during their service, depicting military control over civilian population 
in the OPT (Ibid). The exhibitions target Israeli public and attempt to open their eyes 
wider with visual evidence from territories that are minutes away from their homes. 
Thirdly, BtS holds regular tours to Hebron and South Hebron Hills, which are guided by 
former combatants. Hebron is the second largest city in the West Bank and has a Jewish 
settlement right in the center. The visitors explore “the harsh results of the principle of 
separation and the military presence in the city” (Ibid). The tours are offered both in 
Hebrew and in English. Therefore, they are also targeted towards internationals. Finally, 
BtS takes anonymous testimonies from the soldiers that have served in the OPT since 
2000 and publishes them both in Hebrew and in English in a publicly-accessible 
database in order to locally and internationally publicize the first-hand experience about 
abuse, assassinations, bribery, checkpoints, curfews and closures, deaths and killings, 
destruction of property, human shields, humiliation, looting, losses of livelihood, 
routine, rules of engagement, settlements and settler violence in the OPT (Ibid).  
Outputs 
All the the outputs besides changing perceptions is out of the competence area of 
Informants. However, they do not change the perceptions of their members or 
participants of their activities, as these people already have different assumptions about 
these issues. Rather, these CSOs have very often managed to change the perceptions of 
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those, who are exposed to the information publicized by them (from the interview, 
29.03.2018 and 15.04.2018).  
Outcomes 
The only outcome that the CSOs in this category have displayed is Officials Learning 
Directly. In particular, B’Tselem very often informs officials. However, it does not 
inform them about ideas for conflict resolution, but about human rights violations in the 
OPT, which is still a part of the peace-building process. Moreover, as B’Tselem also 
very often indirectly informs officials about these matters through journalists, 
international diplomats and other interested individuals, who attend briefings and 
presentations regularly organized by it (from the interview, 29.03.2018). Similarly, 
Yesh Din has also often informed officials directly, but again not about ideas for 
conflict resolution. Rather, it reveals information about violations of Palestinians’ rights 
and the violence perpetrated by Jewish settlers. Besides providing information about 
these matters through reports and testimonies, the activists of Yesh Din also accompany 
Palestinians to police stations and other state institutions and inform officials directly 
(from the interview, 15.04.2018). In the same manner, Breaking the Silence is also 
engaged in information dissemination and revealing the truth about the activities of 
Israeli forces in the OPT. Hence, officials very often learn directly from the 
organization by reports and testimonies that it publishes, as well as the frequent 
appearance of its representatives in the media.   
Impacts 
The impacts that these CSOs have are directly tied to the outcomes they have displayed. 
More precisely, B’Tselem has demonstrated Official Confirmation, with governmental 
structures taking its reports and petitions into consideration. In 2011, Israeli military 
decided to investigate every civilian death as a result of B’Tselem’s petition to the High 
Court. Moreover, its reports about human rights and IHL violations are regularly 
addressed by Israeli policy-makers and most of its requests for investigation are opened 
as court cases. Last but not least, B’Tselem’s videos of human rights and IHL violations 
were accepted as official evidence by Israeli courts (from the interview, 29.02.2018). 
Since Yesh Din is very similar to B’Tselem in its activities, it has also displayed 
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Official Confirmation, with governmental structures taking its reports and petitions into 
consideration. However, it has also demonstrated Observed Behaviour, since some of 
the lawsuits submitted by Palestinians with the help of Yesh Din have led to indictment 
and convictions. Moreover, the organization’s complaints to the Military Policy 
Criminal Investigations Division have also led to indictment (Yesh Din, 2018).  
4.4. Politically Involved Organizations  
 
Inputs 
The CSOs in this category advocate different political solutions to the conflict and serve 
as forums for dialogue between officials and non-officials. Therefore, they have diverse 
visions and types of activities. While the absolute majority of the CSOs in this category 
support a two-state solution in one or another form, the Arava Institute for 
Environmental Studies (AIES) works for environmental cooperation across Israel, 
Palestine and Jordan. The institute sees environmental cooperation as a means to foster 
peaceful relations between the parties and uses it as a model for cross-border 
cooperation in other areas, which will be the basis for conflict resolution (AIES, 2018). 
However, H.L. Education for Peace (Geneva Initiative) or simply GI and the Palestinian 
Peace Coalition (PPC) advocate the two-state solution proposed by the Geneva Accord 
of 2003, which was a joint Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative facilitated and developed 
by civil society actors from both sides. Apart from this, PPC also strives for an 
independent Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, for a just resolution of the issue 
of Palestinian refugees and for the establishment of the borders of June 4th, 1967 
between the two states (PPC, 2018). Unlike all the above-mentioned organizations, Two 
State One Homeland proposes its own eleven-point two-state solution, according to 
which the land is shared between Israel and Palestine and these two states are not 
completely separated (TSOH, 2018). OneVoice International, on the other hand, does 
not embrace a particular type of a two-state solution, but any that will result in “an 
independent and viable Palestine and a secure Israel free of conflict” (OneVoice, 2018).  
Similarly to other CSOs engaged in peace-building in Israel-Palestine, these 
organizations are also funded from foreign sources. However, the Arava Institute is also 
financed from different offices of the Israeli government, along with foreign private 
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foundations and grants from the US and European governments. The Israeli 
governmental funds are allocated for ecological and environmental research carried out 
by the institute and not for peace-building projects, nonetheless (AIES, 2013). 
OneVoice International is also different from all the CSOs in this category since besides 
being funded by the US and the UK governments and various organizations from 
around the world, it itself provides financial support for grassroots peace-building 
(OneVoice, 2018).  
Furthermore, the CSOs in this category are also very diverse in terms of their expertise. 
The longest-standing of them is the Arava Institute, founded in 1996, in the wake of the 
implementation process of the Oslo Accords. Since then, it has been preparing Israeli, 
Palestinian and Jordanian young leaders to solve the environmental problems in 
cooperation with each other. Its reports about ecological matters have often been 
reflected in governmental activities as well (from the interview, 22.03.2018). What is 
more, the PPC is also an extremely experienced organization. It was founded in 2000 
and has been engaged in building partnership with the Israeli peace camp, spreading the 
principles of non-violence, dialogue and tolerance, increasing international support for 
the Palestinian cause and for creating a space for rational dialogue about the solutions to 
the conflict, having led over 250 projects about these issues (PPC, 2018). The most 
important partner of the PPC is Geneva Initiative (GI), which itself was founded in 
2003, after the creating of the Geneva Accord and has been active in promoting the 
official adoption of this document ever since. Besides this accord, it also promotes the 
adoption of other peace initiatives, such as the Quartet Roadmap, Clinton Parameters, 
Bush Vision and the Arab Peace Initiative (GI, 2018). Two States One Homeland, on 
the other hand, is relatively new, founded in 2013. It has been engaged with different 
societal levels to promote its own eleven-point two-state solution (from the interview, 
12.04.2018). Unlike all the aforementioned CSOs, OneVoice is not involved in the 
conflict to a large extent. It was established in 2002 and has been addressing different 
political issues of the conflict with campaigns and similar activities.  
The relationships and the personnel of these CSOs are also diverse. All of them partner 
with regional and international organizations, the EU and other European governments 
and the US. The PPC and GI are each other's largest partners, frequently conducting 
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joint projects. Contrary to these organizations, Two States One Homeland does not have 
permanent partners locally or internationally and forms ad hoc partnerships with 
different organizations in Israel during its events (Ibid). As for their personnel, due to 
the fact that the Arava Institute is an academic institution, its staff includes professional 
academics and its alumni, who also participate in various projects (AIES, 2018). The 
PPC is also distinct as brings together current and former ministers, members of the 
Legislative Council and various political parties as well as civil society activists and 
youth (PPC, 2018).  
Activities 
As noted above, the CSOs in this category advocate a two-state solution in different 
forms. To begin with, H.L. Education for Peace (Geneva Initiative) or simply GI 
supports the two-state solution based on the Geneva Accord of 2003. To do so, GI 
divides its focus in two main directions. Firstly, GI attempts to engage the Israeli 
society in various aspects of the conflict. It holds seminars, conferences, workshops, 
tours and lectures for Israeli journalists, civil society and opinion leaders as well as 
decision-makers, who also include officials from the center-right. During these 
meetings, the participants discuss the opportunities and challenges for the two-state 
solution and the possibilities for building peace (GI, 2017: 19). Moreover, GI also 
works in the peace-building sphere, which includes joint activities for Israeli and 
Palestinian decision-makers, journalists, women, and youth. Besides discussing the 
opportunities and challenges to the resolution of the conflict, these meetings enable its 
attendees to tackle misperceptions, dispel stereotypes and realize that there are partners 
committed to peace on the other side (Ibid: 4). 
Like Geneva Initiative, the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) also advocates the two-
state solution based on the Geneva Accord of 2003. To do so, its activities go into three 
main directions. Firstly, in the direction of political dialogue, PPC focuses on dialogue 
with its Israeli partners and organizes symposiums about the two-state solution, the 
issues of Palestinian refugees, the end of Israeli and the adoption of the Geneva 
Initiative of 2003 as the permanent status agreement (from the interview, 02.04.2018). 
Secondly, in the sphere of outreach and peace education, the organization is active in 
educating and empowering Palestinians, mainly youth and women. PPC conducts a lot 
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of different workshops, seminars and lectures about cultural aspects of both societies, 
the role of individuals in peace-building, shared national responsibility, the importance 
of dialogue and non-violence and communication (Ibid). Finally, in the domain of 
international advocacy, the target audience for PPC is the international community and 
media. The organization works for building a local and an international base that 
supports the Palestinian cause and people in protecting their rights. In this regard, PPC 
holds workshops and seminars that are attended by international diplomats and 
journalists and other representatives from different kinds of media (Ibid).  
Unlike the CSOs described above, as already mentioned, Two States One Homeland 
(TSOH) has its own eleven-point two-state solution that is distinct from all the other 
political solutions to the conflict. To spread its message, the activities of TSOH go into 
several different directions. Firstly, the representatives of TSOH meet with local 
communities where they discuss the two-state solution offered by the movement, its 
opportunities and importance, the reasons for its success and for the failure of other 
solutions (from the interview, 12.04.2018). Secondly, TSOH holds conferences three-
four times a year, which is attended by Knesset members and other opinion shapers and 
policy makers in Israel. The attendees discuss the two-state solution offered by TSOH 
and the possibilities of its implementation (Ibid). Finally, TSOH publishes articles, 
papers and other information in different media sources, which serves the purpose of 
advocating its cause for bigger local and international masses. What is more, its 
representatives participate in conferences in different Europeans countries to raise 
awareness and support for the solution it offers (Ibid).   
Furthermore, OneVoice International is in favour of the existence of independent Israeli 
and Palestinian states. To achieve this, besides supporting organizations in Israel and 
Palestine, OneVoice conducts programs of its own in the region. It has initiated 
different campaigns which encouraged average Israeli and Palestinians to become more 
active in achieving peace and a two-state solution (OneVoice, 2006) and under which 
movies based on the essays written by 2 500 Jewish and Palestinian schoolchildren were 
shown worldwide, aiming to create hope in the region that peace will be achieved 
(OneVoice, 2008). Moreover, throughout 2009-2010, OneVoice organized meetings in 
town halls between Jews and Palestinians, where the participants talked about the 
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pressing issues and expressed their private views. The talks also helped to create the 
feeling that there are partners on both sides willing to end the conflict (OneVoice, 
2010). After these talks, OneVoice moved to creating a forum through which the public 
could actually communicate with their governmental leaders and share the ideas they 
had. OneVoice co-founded its first caucus in the Knesset, which worked for the 
achievement of a two-state solution (OneVoice, 2011). In 2012 and 2013, two other 
caucuses were created in the Knesset, which worked for ending the Israeli-Arab conflict 
(not only Palestinian). What is more, OneVoice has also worked for raising public 
awareness about settlements and its effect on everyday lives of Palestinians. Its young 
representatives marched in the streets of Israeli cities holding giant checks of NIS 32 
billion, which is the amount that Israeli authorities spend on these settlements a year. 
The marchers spread the message to average Israelis that each of them loses one-month 
rent of their apartments or one-semester tuition fee at universities every year because of 
these constructions (OneVoice, 2014). However, perhaps, the most important activity 
for OneVoice was its first annual conference in Tel Aviv, where the economic issues of 
the conflict were discussed and which was attended by MKs and former Israeli 
ministers, journalists and 500 Israelis (Ibid). 
Last but not least, The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies is the only CSO in the 
category that uses environmental cooperation to bring Jews and Palestinians, as well as 
Jordanians, closer together. In 2016, it initiated a “Track II Environmental Forum,” 
which enables its participants from Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian civil societies to 
work together on issues like climate change, renewable energy, and similar matters. The 
Institute considers this kind of cooperation to be contributing to the process of fostering 
long-term understanding between the three. In the same year, the Institute also began 
holding annual conferences about cross-border environmental cooperation, which not 
only includes non-officials but also MKs and Palestinian politicians. These conferences 
aim to encourage dialogue between governmental and civil society representatives, as 
well as the conflicting parties. By discussing environmental issues, the Arava Institute 
attempts to challenge the perception that there are no partners on the other side, which 
can also contribute to building partnerships in conflict resolution (AIES, 2017).  
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Outputs 
As the CSOs in this category are involved in the political aspects of the conflict in ways 
distinct from each other, their outputs also differ.  In particular, the activities of the 
Arava Institute always generate ideas about how to deepen cooperation between Israel 
and Palestine, which can lead to conflict resolution (from the interview, 22.03.2018). 
Similarly, as OneVoice is active in various fields of the conflict, its activities very often 
generate new ideas about how to eradicate the most serious problems connected with 
the conflict, rather than about how to resolve it (from the survey, 31.03.2018). Unlike 
these two, Geneva Initiative and Two States One Homeland are both oriented towards 
promoting a two-state solution in one or another form. Thus, their activities do not 
generate new ideas (from the interview, 12.04.2018). Even though PPC does not focus 
on finding new ways for resolving the conflict and works for advancing the two-state 
solution, new ideas have still very often been generated about the ways to address the 
most pressing issues of the conflict (from the interview, 02.04.2018).  
Furthermore, although these CSOs are primarily concerned with political aspects of the 
conflict, some of them still work for fostering close interactions between Jews and 
Palestinians and also frequently serve as moderators. More precisely, because of its 
effective moderations, Arava Institute has always built relationships between and 
changed the perceptions of the participants of its activities (from the interview, 
22.03.2018). Similarly, OneVoice International has frequently served as a moderator 
and its moderations have been effective, which have very often led the participants of its 
activities to build relationships. What is more, these people, along with the general 
public have also very often changed their perceptions of the conflict as a result of the 
campaigns and other activities of OneVoice (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In the same 
manner, Geneva Initiative has had effective moderations due to which the attendees 
have often changer their perceptions as well as built relationships (GI, 2017: 4). 
However, unlike these organizations, the PPC has had ineffective moderations and the 
fact that it has often built relationships between and changed the perceptions of the 
participants of its activities can be put down to fact that it is engaged in various spheres 
of the conflict and conducts a lot of different types of activities besides moderations 
(from the interview, 02.04.2018).  
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Outcomes 
Due to the fact that the CSOs in this category are involved in the political aspects of the 
conflict, it is logical that all of them have displayed certain outcomes. In particular, the 
Arava Institute has sometimes included officials in its activities, mainly MKs and 
Palestinian politicians (from the interview, 22.03.2018). Official participation has also 
often occurred in case of Geneva Initiative – a part of its activities is to organize 
meetings for Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers, journalists, women, and youth. 
Similarly, officials have sometimes participated in the activities of OneVoice as well, 
namely in the conferences it has organized, which have been attended by MKs and 
former ministers (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In the same manner, officials, mainly 
Palestinians, but also Israelis, often participate in Palestinian Peace Coalition's 
activities, primarily in the dialogues, symposiums, and conferences it organizes about 
the two-state solution, the issues of refugees and the Geneva Accord (from the 
interview, 02.04.2018). Last but not least, as Two States One Homeland promotes its 
own eleven-point two-state solution, officials that support the plan often participate in 
the dialogues the organization holds about it as well (from the interview, 12.04.2018).  
Furthermore, officials sometimes learn directly from the Arava Institute, as it provides 
them with reports and information about ways to use environmental cooperation in 
peace-building (from the interview, 22.03.2018). OneVoice International has also often 
directly informed officials about new ideas generated during its activities, mainly 
different ministries and MKs (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In addition, as PPC works 
closely with the members of the PA, it very often directly informs them about its ideas. 
Two States One Homeland, however, often informs those officials who are against 
peace or who are in favour of the one-state solution about the necessity of the two-state 
solution as presented by the organization (from the interview, 12.04.2018).  
As for Officials Learning Indirectly, OneVoice International and the PPC are the only 
CSOs that have displayed this outcome. In particular, One Voice has very often 
indirectly informed officials about the ways to contribute to peace and eradicate the 
existent problems through the three caucuses it has co-founded in the Knesset. As for 
PPC, officials have also sometimes been indirectly informed about the organization’s 
ideas by its local and international partners (from the interview, 02.04.2018). Last but 
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not least, OneVoice is the only CSOs in this category that has also pressured officials 
publicly primarily by its numerous public campaigns, which include installations in the 
street, but also by marches against settlement-building and land confiscation. 
Impacts 
Even though all the CSOs in this category displayed outcomes, only three of them have 
had impacts. In particular, besides being involved in the political matters of the conflict, 
OneVoice is also engaged in non-violent resistance against occupational policies. In 
2014, OneVoice initiated a campaign, during which 10 000 shekel notes with Finance 
Minister Yair Lapid’s face were distributed throughout Israel to protest the construction 
of additional settlements in the West Bank. Less than a week later Lapid announced that 
he would not transfer any more money for new settlement construction (OneVoice, 
2014). In this case, OneVoice displayed Official Confirmation. This outcome has also 
been demonstrated by Palestinian Peace Coalition, as its proposal about the issue of 
Palestinian refugees was adopted by the PA and became its official position. The 
proposal puts forward the following possibilities: 1) their return to the future state of 
Palestine; 2) complete settlement and full integration in their host countries (Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon); 3) their relocation to other countries in the Arab world, as well as 
outside the region; and 4) return of a small portion of these refugees to Israel, but not of 
fewer than the their average number in other countries (from the interview, 02.04.2018). 
Two States One Homeland has also displayed Official Confirmation since its 11-point 
solution to the conflict has been accepted as a viable solution by the Israeli President 
Reuven Rivlin (from the interview, 12.04.2018). 
As for Observed Behaviour, OneVoice International is the only CSOs that has 
demonstrated this outcome. More precisely, in 2012, Israeli forces intended to 
confiscate land from Palestinians in the village of Beit Oula, but the process stopped 
because of the protest organized by OneVoice (from the survey, 31.03.2018).  This is an 
instance of Observed Behaviour since officials acted in ways consistent with the 
demands of the movement. However, even though the eleven-point two-state solution 
proposed by Two States One Homeland was accepted by the Israeli president, as it has 
not been implemented, it cannot be considered Observed Behaviour.  
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4.5. Mixed Organizations 
 
Inputs 
The CSOs in this category combine grassroots activities, information dissemination, 
political involvement and non-violent resistance. In particular, The Abraham Fund 
Initiatives (AFI) is engaged in grassroots work and information dissemination and 
works for achieving full and equal citizenship of Israel for Jews and Arabs (AFI, 2018). 
Grassroots work and information dissemination is the competence area of The Parents' 
Circle – the Families' Forum's (PCFF) as well. It is a joint Israeli-Palestinian non-profit 
association that is comprised of the family members of those that have been killed as a 
result of the conflict. It believes the achievement of the political solution to the conflict 
needs a base and sees the reconciliation of the peoples as such a base (PCFF, 2018). In 
addition, Windows – Channels for Communication (simply Windows) is another 
organization working in the same area. It is a join Israeli-Palestinian NGO that works 
for carrying out long-term educational programs for youth, which go deep into the 
details and the most troubling issues of the conflict, attempting to alter the perceptions 
of youngsters from both sides and cause a change in the conditions of the conflict 
through publicity (Windows, 2018).  
Contrary to the CSOs described above, Combatants for Peace (CFP) and Wi’am: The 
Palestinian Conflict Transformation Center (Wi’am) combine grassroots work with non-
violent resistance against what they see as the Israeli occupation policies. More 
precisely, CFP was founded by former IDF soldiers and former Palestinian combatants 
and works for transforming and resolving the conflict, ending the Israeli occupation and 
building a peaceful future (CFP, 2018). Wi’am, on the other hand, is a grassroots CSO 
in Palestine that works for promoting peace, justice, acceptance, reconciliation and the 
transformation of the conflict. Not only does it focus on these values, but it also 
attempts to eradicate the division inside the Palestinian society (Wi’am, 2018).  
Last but not least, Women Wage Peace (WWP) is different from all the above-
mentioned CSOs, as it does not focus on grassroots work and combines non-violent 
resistance against occupation with political involvement in the conflict. It works for the 
achievement of a non-violent, mutually acceptable solution to the conflict (WWP, 
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2018).  What is more, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) is 
also exceptional as it is active in three different fields: non-violent resistance, political 
involvement and information dissemination. In particular, ICAHD attempts to end the 
demolition of Palestinians’ houses by Israeli forces. It also works for the dissemination 
of information and a just political settlement of the conflict. It is one of the first 
organizations in Israel to announce that it supports a one-state solution, in which both 
Jews and Palestinians live together and aspire to their rights (ICAHD, 2018).  
Furthermore, these CSOs are very diverse in terms of their funding as well. While CFP 
and PCFF are financed from foreign sources – governmental entities and private 
foundations, Wi’am is also funded by donations from individuals, as well as foreign 
governmental donors (NGO Monitor, 2017). Windows, on the other hand, is mainly 
financed by private foundations and its only governmental donor is the Swiss Embassy 
to Israel. It also has a relatively small income from its Public Programs such as tours, 
public events and Arabic classes (Windows, 2018). AFI is also funded by foreign 
sources, but they only include private funds and individuals (AFI, 2018), while WWP is 
the only CSO in this category that is also financed by donors from Israel as well as 
abroad, most of which are private individuals (WWP, 2018). Finally, this kind of 
information is unavailable for ICAHD because it removed all the information about its 
donors and finances in 2015 (NGO Monitor, 2016).  
These CSOs are also distinct from each other in terms of their expertise. The longest-
standing of them is The Abraham Fund Initiatives, founded in 1989 and having been 
engaged in various activities since then. In 2003 it began advocating for institutional 
changes in Israel, which would contribute to the construction of a just and inclusive 
society and started implementing different programs for fostering close interaction 
between the two peoples (AFI, 2018). Another CSO that started out as a low-profile 
organization, but expanded later is Windows, which started as a volunteer-based 
organization in 1991. It began with training young Israeli and Palestinian journalists to 
publish a Hebrew-Arabic magazine, looking into the facts about the conflict more 
deeply and analytically and tackling with misinformation.  Throughout the years of its 
existence, it has developed new ways of operation, such as educational programs for 
youth and children, public events, and tours, which serve the purpose of changing 
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misperceptions, exposing the truth and encouraging interaction (Windows, 2018). It also 
remained very active during the Second Intifada of 2000-2005, holding lectures, 
debates, movie nights and tours to provide an alternative to the information spread by 
mainstream media. Moreover, in 2000, it began a Humanitarian Aid Project, delivering 
communities in need both in Palestine and In Israel food, clothing and household items 
(Ibid). The project continued till 2011 and gave the organization a first-hand experience 
of what exactly the situation was in the most affected areas, as well as a reputation. 
Finally, Wi'am is another CSO that is also experienced in multiple fields. It was 
founded in 1994 and has been engaged in almost every field of Palestinian social life 
since then. Besides its peace-building programs, it has also been active in fighting 
domestic violence inside the Palestinian society and empowering women (Wi'am, 
2018). However, the newest of the CSOs in this category is Women Wage Peace, with 
only around three years of expertise. It was founded in 2014 after the Gaza War. Since 
its inception, the WWP has held hundreds of meetings between Jews and Palestinians, 
dozens of exhibitions about peace, has participated in tens of discussions, conferences, 
and lectures at universities, and organized several mass events (WWP, 2018). 
The CSOs in this category also differ from each other with regards to their personnel 
and relationships. The one with the biggest network of connections is AFI, which is 
staffed with Jews, Palestinians, and internationals. It also has offices in New York and 
London and has relations with different educational and governmental institutions in 
Israel and a lot of private foundations in Europe and in the US. In 2007, it was granted 
Special Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(United Nations, 2008: 7). Moreover, CFP is another CSO that has also received several 
awards for peace-building and non-violence from Israeli and international organizations. 
It is staffed with former Israeli and Palestinian combatants as well as other employees 
and partners with local and international NGOs, as well as foreign governmental entities 
(CFP, 2018)). Furthermore, ICAHD also has support groups abroad, namely in the US, 
the UK, Germany, Finland, and Australia. It partners with different organizations in 
Israel and Palestine and is mainly staffed with Israelis but is open to everyone who 
wants to become a member (ICAHD, 2018). 
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Unlike the above-mentioned organizations, PCFF, Windows and WWP do not have 
large networks of connections. However, they are large in terms of their personnel. 
Firstly, as already mentioned, it is staffed with the Jews and Palestinians who lost their 
family members because of the conflict and involves over 600 families. Secondly, the 
personnel of Windows consists of not only locals but also internationals. It has a small 
staff, a large portion of which are volunteers. Nevertheless, the organization works in a 
triangular format – bringing together Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel and 
Palestinians from the West Bank, allowing the three communities to discuss the issues 
that trouble them in particular (Windows, 2018). Finally, WWP is Israel's largest 
grassroots movement. It has around 30 000 Jewish and Palestinian members from the 
right, center and the left from both Israel and Palestine (WWP, 2018). 
Activities 
The Abraham Fund Initiatives is the only CSOs in this category that allocates a great 
deal of attention to education. More specifically, AFI considers language to be an 
important bridge and social glue. Therefore, AFI started the project Ya Salam – Spoken 
Arabic in 2005. As part of Ya Salam, schoolchildren start learning Arabic from Arab 
teachers, which also gets them acquainted with Arabic culture and the aspects it shares 
with Jewish culture. In 2016, Spoken Arabic became mandatory for all Jewish schools 
(AFI, 2018). AFI also implemented a one-year pilot project Ivrit B'Salam – Spoken 
Hebrew in 2014-2015 in 28 Arabic schools, which not only served the purpose of 
increasing the Hebrew fluency of Arab schoolchildren but also deepening their 
knowledge of Jewish culture and fostering interaction with Jews (Ibid). 
AFI also works for leadership development and empowerment. In this light, the 
organization launches tours to the Knesset for Arab women, during which they discuss 
political issues and acquire leadership skills. In 2015, Under the project Community 
Volunteering, Arab school-leavers work in local welfare and educational institutions, 
which provides them with equal opportunities to those of Jews and also prepares them 
for university entrance exams. All of this aims towards connecting the two societies and 
building a peaceful future (Ibid). Furthermore, under the project Minority 
Mainstreaming in the Media, AFI study tours for Hebrew-language journalists around  
Israel and the West Bank, as a result of which translated updates from Arabic media are 
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sent out around Israel, which also reaches decision makers (Ibid). Apart from this, AFI 
is also active in the sphere of safe communities and police, which makes the 
organization unique, as it is the only one in the category to be working hand in hand 
with the police system. More precisely, officers from Israeli police attend trainings 
about cultural issues in the Arab communities, as well their needs and rights, which 
serves the purpose of at improving the relations between Israeli police force and Arab 
citizens (Ibid).  
Besides, AFI, another organization engaged in grassroots work and information 
dissemination is The Parents' Circle – The Families' Forum (PCFF). The participants of  
Dialogue Meetings, which includes adults, youth, and schoolchildren, tell each other 
personal stories related to the conflict to show the negative effects and why it is 
necessary to choose reconciliation over fighting and (PCFF, 2018). Another 
comprehensive project that PCFF has run since 2006 is the Israeli-Palestinian Memorial 
Day Ceremony. The project entails a ceremony that is held every year on the eve of the 
Memorial Day for Israeli Soldiers. The reason PCFF chose the latter date is to hold their 
own ceremony is to convey a message to both parties that war is a choice and not a 
predetermined conditioned. The ceremony is attended by Israeli and Palestinian 
bereaved families, intellectuals and musicians (Ibid). A similar project is the 
International Peace Day Events carried out by PCFF between 2008 and 2014. The 
International Peace Day is celebrated on September 21st and PCFF held dialogue 
meetings about the possibilities and setbacks for peace-building (Ibid). In the field of 
information revelation element, PCFF runs two creative projects. The Exhibitions 
project presents photos depicting the atrocities of the conflict and hand-made objects 
and other artifacts showing messages in favour of peace-building. The Taking Steps 
project brings together the Palestinian female members of PCFF, who embroider a bird 
– as a symbol of peace – on shoes and later sell them locally and internationally. Both 
of these projects aim to raise awareness about the destructive effect of the conflict and 
the need for its resolution. 
The final CSO in this category that combines grassroots work with information 
dissemination is Windows – Channels for Communication. The organization's main 
project is Youth Media and Action Program (YMAP), which facilitates meetings and 
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discussions with "the other side." The program also provides the participants with skills 
to become parts of movements that call for a change in Israeli and Palestinian societies 
(Windows, 2018). Apart from this, Windows runs a humanitarian program that 
empowers women and youth, helps locals with the sale of olive oil and embroidery, and 
provides humanitarian aid where necessary in the West Bank. In Israel, on the other 
hand, Windows distributes Hebrew-Arabic magazine, offering the public alternative 
information to the one spread by mainstream Israeli media. It also runs Public Programs 
that include film screening, educational tours, and lectures, which are also held in 
English (Ibid). In addition, Windows has developed its own Theory of Change, which is 
a methodology that works step by step, explaining how a change in such a conflictual 
situation can actually be achieved. The organization trains educators from schools, 
individuals and representatives from other NGOs in this Theory, providing them with 
conflict-management skills and sharing its long experience with them (Ibid).  
Unlike the CSOs described above, Combatants for Peace (CFP) combines grassroots 
work with nonviolent resistance. In particular, CFP is committed to fostering mutual 
understanding among the peoples. Since its foundation in 2006, CFP has been 
organizing monthly tours to Bethlehem, which serve the purpose of showing the visitors 
the realities connected with the Separation Wall, the settlement-building and the general 
impact of the conflict on people’s lives (CFP, 2018). In addition, in 2012, CFP initiated 
a project Face-to-Face, which aimed to promote the values of non-violence and mutual 
understanding. The members of the organization spread posters around cities in Israel 
and Palestine with messages calling for ending the occupation, recognition of the other 
side and the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement (CFP, 2012). As for non-
violent resistance, CFP protests against the violations of Palestinians’ rights. In this 
direction, CFP has organized over 70 protests and rallies against settlement-
construction, illegal land confiscation, the destruction of Palestinian’s farms and 
livelihood, illegal construction of roads and uprooting of olive trees (one of the main 
sources of income for Palestinians) as well as several solidarity rallies for those killed or 
severely harmed by the conflict.  
Similarly to CFP, Wi’am: The Palestinian Conflict Transformation Center also 
combines grassroots work with non-violent resistance. More precisely, firstly, Wi’iam 
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holds trainings and capacity-building workshops for Palestinian youth about topics like 
conflict transformation, advocacy, intercultural dialogue, leadership, democracy and 
human rights. This aims to create young leaders who will become agents of peaceful 
resolution of the conflict (Wi’am, 2018).  Secondly, Wi’iam also organizes educational 
and cultural tours for internationals and interested individuals to show them the cultural 
heritage of Palestine and highlight Palestinians’ historical attachment to the land, as 
well as demonstrate the realities of Palestinian cities and the effect of occupation on 
them (Ibid). Finally, Wi’am is engaged in non-violent resistance against Israeli 
occupation policies. It often organizes demonstrations against the separation wall, 
uprooting of olive trees (which is one of the most important raw materials for 
Palestinians) and the illegal apprehension of Palestinians.  
Furthermore, Women Wage Peace attempts to transform the conflict through public 
pressure and political involvement. The very first activity of WWP was the creation of 
the movement in 2014, during which 1 000 women dressed in white and rode a train to 
Sderot as an expression of their commitment to peace. Since 2015, however, WWP has 
organized numerous peaceful protests demanding a peace initiative from the Israeli 
government, as well as marches in the Israeli cities involving 30 000 people (WWP, 
2018). As for WWP's political involvement, in 2017, it created the Women's Caucus for 
Peace and Security in the Knesset, which is jointly run by Knesset members (MKs) 
from the Zionist Camp and a left-wing group Meretz (Braudo-Bahat, 2017). The Caucus 
works for the achievement of a mutually acceptable political settlement of the conflict 
(Ibid). 
Last but not least, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) is 
different from all the CSOs in this category as it is simultaneously engaged in non-
violent resistance, political involvement, and information dissemination. Its primary 
focus is resisting the demolition of Palestinians' houses, though.  The activists of 
ICAHD physically surround the houses, blocking the vehicles from demolishing them. 
In addition, it also encourages Palestinians as well as Israelis to rebuild those houses 
that have been brought down (ICAHD, 2018) Secondly, ICAHD also Works for a 
political settlement of the conflict. In this domain, it endorses two political solutions: 
strives for ending the existence of Israel as nation-state for only Jews and for creating a 
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single state for both peoples; or transforming Israel into a democratic state, which will 
protect the rights of its Palestinian minority and which will exist alongside an 
independent state of Palestine (Ibid). Finally, in the sphere of information 
dissemination, ICAHD provides the local and international public with information 
about the realities of the OPT and the demolition of Palestinians' houses by organizing 
briefings, conferences, and tours to the OPT as well as to different parts of Israel. 
Moreover, the organization produces books, pamphlets, reports, position papers, films 
and other material about these matters. What is more, ICAHD often meets with 
diplomats, journalists, international activists, fact finders and interested individuals to 
provide them with information about the above-mentioned issues (Ibid). 
Outputs 
As the CSOs in this category are engaged in multiple spheres of the conflict, they have 
also displayed a wide range of outputs. Firstly, as AFI works with different age groups 
(children youth and adults) as well as societal sectors (communities, police and the 
media), its activities often generate ideas (from the survey, 27.03.18). Secondly, besides 
protesting against and physically blocking the demolition of Palestinians houses by 
Israeli forces, ICAHD is also engaged in finding political solutions to the conflict. 
Therefore, it sometimes generates new ideas about how to solve the conflict (from the 
interview, 16.04.2018). Thirdly, even though Wi'am aims at fostering close interactions 
between Jews and Palestinians, as well as demonstrating against the violations of 
Palestinians' rights, it still conducts dialogue meetings, as a result of which, new ideas 
are generated but rarely (from the interview, 14.04.2018). Windows, however, has very 
often generated new ideas through it numerous dialogues and other meetings (from the 
interview, 23.03.2018). 
As most of the CSOs in this category are engaged in grassroots work besides other types 
of activities, building relationships is the outcome they have displayed good track 
records of. To begin with, Windows has always managed to build relationships between 
the participants of its activities because it is very actively engaged in grassroots work, 
involving a lot of Jews and Palestinians (from the interview, 23.03.2018). Secondly, 
Combatants for Peace has often built the relationships of its members and the 
participants of its activities, be it dialogue meetings or protests (from the interview, 
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18.04.2018). Thirdly, the PCFF has also often built relationships, since it creates 
communities comprised of Jews and Palestinians to advance peace-building even 
further (PCFF, 2018). Fourthly, even though AFI very actively conducts grassroots 
projects, its representatives have indicated that they have only sometimes built 
relationships between its participants. The same result has been produced by Wi'am, 
which has also sometimes built relationships between the attendees of its projects. This 
can be explained by the fact that Wi'am is not very active in bi-national grassroots 
projects (from the interview, 14.04.2018). Last but not least, even though grassroots 
work is out of the focus of WWP and ICAHD, they still have good track records. In 
particular, WWP has always managed to build relationships between the participants of 
its activities, as it organizes numerous rallies, protests, and other mass events, during 
which Jews and Palestinians fight for a common cause, which greatly contributes to the 
formation of friendships and partnerships (from the survey, 19.04.2018). As for 
ICAHD, due to its joint character and the fact that it works for Palestinians' rights, its 
activities have often built the relationships between participants (from the interview, 
16.04.2018). 
Furthermore, like for many grassroots CSOs, effective moderation and changed 
perceptions are linked with each other for the organizations in this category as well. In 
other words, the CSOs that have had effective or mostly effective moderations, also 
displayed that their participants have changed their perceptions of the other side and the 
conflict. In particular, even though WWP is a movement, it has still moderated 
hundreds of unofficial dialogues between Jews and Palestinians and its moderations 
have been very effective, as a result of which, the organization has always managed to 
change the perceptions of the participants of its activities (from the survey, 19.04.2018). 
In the same manner, the PCFF has had effective moderations during its unofficial 
meetings between Jews and Palestinians and has, thus, always changed the perceptions 
of the participants of its activities. On top of this, its good record for this outcome is 
also connected to the fact that PCFF spreads information about the negative aspects of 
the conflict as well (PCFF, 2018). Finally, AFI also frequently serves as moderator for 
unofficial dialogue between Jews and Palestinians and its moderations are mostly 
effective.  What is more, the organization is also engaged in information dissemination 
with schools, communities and the general public. Nevertheless, AFI’s representatives 
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indicated that its projects have only sometimes changed the perceptions of their 
participants (from the survey, 27.03.2018).  
Moreover, this category also includes CSOs, for which changing perceptions does not 
depend on effective moderation. To begin with, Windows has not had effective 
moderations, but it is actively engaged in information dissemination. Therefore, it has 
always managed to change the perceptions of those, who are exposed to the alternative 
truth the organization spreads (from the interview, 23.09.2018). Apart from this, 
ICAHD has also often changed the perceptions of the general public as the movement 
actively disseminates information about what it sees as the occupation of Palestine by 
Israel and also protests against it (from the interview, 16.04.2018). Last but not least, 
demonstrations against what they regard as Israel's occupational policies is also the 
reason why CFP and Wi'am have very often altered the perceptions about the conflict 
that exist in the Israeli and Palestinian society. In particular, CFP regularly organizes 
protests against the violations of Palestinians' rights by Israel, which contributes to the 
process of breaking the deeply-rooted "national consensus" of the Israeli society about 
the other side and the conflict (from the interview, 18.04.2018). As for Wi'am, besides 
human rights violations, it also protests against the Separation Wall, uprooting of olive 
trees (which is one of the most important raw materials for Palestinians) and the illegal 
apprehension of Palestinians, which serves as the basis for changing the perceptions of 
the local public (from the interview, 14.04.2018). 
Outcomes 
As these CSOs are diverse in terms of their functionality, they also differ in their 
outcomes. Most of them have displayed Official Participation with varied results. 
Firstly, officials have also often participated in the activities carried out by AFI (from 
the survey, 27.03.2018). More precisely, as AFI holds different educational projects, the 
ministry of education is very much involved in these projects. What is more, AFI 
organizes visits to the Knesset for Arab women, in which MKs also take part (AFI, 
2018). Secondly, officials very often participate in dialogues and discussions that WWP 
organizes. These are primarily the representatives of the Israeli left, right, and center 
(WWP, 2018). Finally, officials have sometimes participated in the activities of CFP.  
72 
 
These mainly include left-wing MKs who support the organization and its cause (from 
the interview, 18.04.2018).  
As for Officials Learning Directly, only two CSOs have demonstrated this outcome. In 
particular, AFI also very often informs officials about the new ideas it has, as well as 
about challenges to the coexistence of the two peoples (from the survey, 27.03.2018). In 
addition, officials sometimes learn directly from ICAHD as well not only about the 
human rights violations and illegal demolitions of Palestinians’ houses, but also about 
ideas for conflict resolution. Officials are mainly informed by books, pamphlets, 
reports, position papers, films and other material published by ICAHD (ICAHD, 2018). 
Women Wage Peace, however, in the only CSO from which officials learn indirectly. 
As WWP has its own Caucus in the Knesset, officials are very often indirectly informed 
about the violations of Palestinians’ rights, the most pressing issues of the conflict and 
the need for peace by the Caucus members (from the survey, 19.04.2018).  
Last but not least, some of the CSOs in this category have also pressured officials 
publicly. First of all, the activists of CFP have held over 70 protests and rallies against 
settlement-construction, illegal land confiscation and other violations of Palestinians’ 
rights (CFP, 2018). Secondly, the activists of ICAHD physically surround Palestinians' 
houses, blocking the vehicles from demolishing them. What is more, they also take part 
in demonstrations organized by other movements in Israel (ICAHD, 2018). Thirdly, 
WWP has organized tens of demonstrations, rallies, and marches in protest of Israeli 
policies and in support of peace. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the movement 
was symbolized by a march, in which 1000 activists took part (WWP, 2018). Last but 
not least, Wi'am is also engaged in non-violent resistance against the Separation Wall, 
uprooting of olive trees and the illegal apprehension of Palestinians (Wi’am, 2018). 
What is more, this is the only outcome that the organization has displayed.  
Impacts 
Even though most of the CSOs in the category displayed outcomes, the only one that 
has shown impact is The Abraham Fund Initiatives. More precisely, the Spoken Arabic 
project – Ya Salam – which was proposed by AFI, was adopted by the Ministry of 
Education and it became mandatory in every Jewish school in 2016 (AFI, 2016). In 
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addition, AFI also designed a program for training Israeli police in Palestinian cultural 
aspects to increase their sensitivity and reduce tension between the police and 
Palestinian communities. The Israeli police adopted this program and incorporated it 
into its internal training (from the survey, 27.03.2018). Hence, AFI has displayed 
Official Confirmation as the Ministry adopted the ideas that it had learned from the 
activities of the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour since they implemented 
them. 
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5. The Summary of the Findings 
 
The indicator employed for measuring the minimum changes that the selected CSOs 
have produced was Outputs (namely, Idea Generation, Building Relationships, Effective 
Moderation and Changing Perceptions), whereas the maximum changes were reflected 
in Impacts (namely, Official Confirmation and Observed Behaviour).  The results that 
these CSOs have demonstrated vary across the categories and are intrinsically linked 
with their functionality. To begin with, as Grassroots Organizations investigated in the 
thesis involve ordinary citizens and non-officials and work for intercultural exchange, 
close interactions and consequential reconciliation of the two peoples, their role is 
limited to Outputs, which is the criterion that precisely concerns the people-to-people 
level. In addition, most of them displayed that they have had effective or very effective 
moderations and have often, very often or always managed to build relationships and 
change the perceptions of the participants of their activities. As for idea generation, this 
output is not the primary focus of these grassroots CSOs because of their functionality 
and the competence area. Nevertheless, most of them have produced new ideas about 
how to build peace or transform the conflict, but rarely or only sometimes. Furthermore, 
the functionality of the selected CSOs is major factor for Outcomes (Official 
Participation, Officials Learning Directly, Officials Learning Indirectly and Officials 
Pressured Publicly) as well. As these organizations are oriented towards people-to-
people level rather than towards the official level and do not attempt to transform the 
conflict through public pressure either, only two of them have directly or indirectly 
informed officials about their ideas, but this has happened rarely or only sometimes. 
The same is true for the remaining two Outcomes as well. By the same logic, Impacts is 
the criterion in which these grassroots CSOs do not have any results. The only 
exception is Sadaka-Reut, with its idea of business-free racism having been 
implemented as an ethical code in one of the governmental institutions of Israel. Thus, it 
can be concluded that these CSOs have performed effectively at the people-to-people 
level (Outputs), but have been ineffective at the official level (Outcomes and Impacts).  
Unlike Grassroots CSOs, Resistance Movements attempt to transform or end the 
conflict through public pressure, due to which, none of the four outputs are their 
primary focus. Yet, most of them have often, very often or always built relationships 
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between and changed the perceptions of their activities. However, as Outcomes are 
linked with the remaining two outputs – Idea generation and Effective moderation, the 
absence of these two outputs leads to the absence of Outcomes. The only exception is 
Peace Now, which is also the only CSO from the category that has had moderations. Its 
activities have involved officials, but this has happened rarely. In the same manner, as 
Impacts are the follow-up of Outcomes, the absence of the latter means the absence of 
the former as well. Thus, it is logical that again Peace Now is the only movement that 
has displayed any impacts. As for the last outcome, Officials Pressured Publicly, it is 
the one that all the CSOs from this category have displayed due to the fact that protests 
and demonstrations are their main functions.  Hence, all this speaks to the effectiveness  
at the people-to-people level of even those CSOs that do not explicitly aim at Outputs, 
but their limited effect on the official level.  
Moreover, as Informants primarily work for revealing human rights violations or other 
atrocities in the OPT, all the outputs besides changing perceptions is out of their 
competence area. Therefore, they have very often managed to change the perceptions of 
those, who are exposed to the information publicized by them. Precisely due to the 
functions that these CSOs have, officials often or very often learn directly from them 
about human rights violations in the OPT, rather than about ideas for conflict resolution 
(in the case of B’Tselem, officials very often learn indirectly as well). Following the 
same line, the impacts that these CSOs have are directly tied to the outcomes they have 
displayed, with their reports about IHL and human rights violations in the OPT being 
considered by Israeli courts and leading to indictments. Thus, Informants have proved 
effective at the official level.  
In addition, since Politically Involved Organizations are engaged in the political aspects 
of the conflict in different ways, Idea Generation is part of their work. Therefore, most 
of them have very often produced new ideas about how to solve the conflict (the ones 
that have not done so are those that work for the promotion of the two-state solution and 
for finding new resolution mechanisms). Although other outputs are out of their 
competence area, most of them have often or very often built relationships between and 
changed the perceptions of the participants of their activities and have had effective 
moderations. Logically enough, the CSOs in this category are the ones that have 
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performed the best at the level Outcomes and Impacts. More specifically, all of them 
have sometimes or often included officials in their activities and most of them also 
directly and indirectly informed officials about their ideas. As for Impacts, these ideas 
have been both adopted (Official Confirmation) and put into practice (Observed 
Behaviour) for most of the CSOs. Thus, such results highlight the effectiveness of 
Politically Involved Organizations at people-to-people, as well as the official level.  
Last but not least, despite the fact that not all of the CSOs in the category of Mixed 
Organizations have all the Outputs as their primary focus, most of them have sometimes 
or often generated new ideas about the ways in which the conflict can be resolved. On 
top of this, all of them have had effective moderations and have also often or always 
built the relationships between and changed the perceptions of the participants of their 
activities. However, only two of them have often included officials in their activities 
and have very often informed them directly or indirectly. As for Officials Pressured 
Publicly, most of them have organized numerous demonstrations and rallies and those 
that have not, are the ones that do not work for transforming the conflict through public 
pressure. Finally, only one of these organizations has displayed Impacts. Hence, such 
performance points to the effectiveness of these organizations at the people-to-people 
level but their limit effect at the official level.  
To sum up, while all the categories have performed well at the level of Outputs (i.e. 
people-to-people level), only two categories (Informants and Politically Involved 
Organizations) have shown to be effective at the level of official policy-making. Based 
on these findings, it is to be concluded that the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine 
conflict have mobilized public support for peace-building, brought people from the 
conflicting parties closer and have contributed to their reconciliation, but they have had 
only limited effect on official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution. Thus, the 
main argument put forward by the thesis has been confirmed.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The thesis analyzed the role that the selected CSOs have had in the peace-building 
process of the Israel-Palestine conflict. To do so, this work employed Track Two 
Diplomacy as its theoretical foundation, outlining its various interpretations, concrete 
mechanisms, its evolution and its types. Besides this, the thesis also described the 
different roles Track Two activities can have, as well the limitations that they face, 
which proved useful for forming adequate expectations about the influence that the 
selected CSOs can have. On top of this, the work at hand also provided a brief overview 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict, discussing the issues that render it intractable.  
Furthermore, the methodological section presented a few words about the Israeli and the 
Palestinian civil society in general, highlighting their similarities and differences as well 
as the problems they face in the process of peace-building. As for the concrete CSOs, 
the basis for their selection relied on three criteria: functionality (what their goals are), 
performance (the work they have done to achieve these goals) and credibility (public 
and official-level perceptions towards them). 
Moreover, the empirical part relied on a comprehensive five-indicator framework, 
which measured the role that Track Two actors, in this case, selected thirty CSOs, have 
played in the peace-building process, assuming that their ultimate goal is to affect the 
official-level decision-making.  These five indicators included Inputs – the raw 
materials that create Track Two Diplomacy, Activities – the actions taken by Track Two 
moderators (in our case CSOs) during the peace-building process, Outputs – tangible 
and intangible micro-level changes at the people-to-people level that result from these 
activities, Outcomes – the processes of transferring Outputs to the official level, and 
Impact – instances of officials changing their behaviour as a result of Outcomes.  
The thesis has found that all of the categories of these CSOs have proven to be effective 
at the level of Outputs, having built new relationships between Jews and Palestinians, 
having changed the negative perceptions of the participants of their activities not only 
towards each other, but towards multiple aspects of the conflict, and having had 
effective unofficial moderations. By contrast, only two out of the five categories have 
demonstrated to have an influence at the level of Outcomes and Impacts, which are the 
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official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution. Hence, the main argument of the 
thesis has been confirmed.  
Last but not least, the objective of the thesis was to fill in the existent gap in the 
literature about the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has mainly revolved around the 
official negotiations and political aspects, not allocating sufficient attention to the need 
for the readiness of the two societies for reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and 
subsequent reconciliation, as well as the involvement of non-official actors.  By 
determining the role that the selected CSOs have played, the thesis also provides an 
insight into the limits that such organizations have in intractable conflicts. In addition, 
understanding these limits also gives the opportunity to learn the lessons about ways in 
which they can be eradicated or, at least, mitigated. On top of this, the findings of this 
thesis also speak about the common impediments that Track Two efforts face in such 
conflicts, but they cannot be fully generalized for other cases.  
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